By Manfredo Kempff, El Diario:

President Rodrigo Paz and his cabinet ministers must possess some very important confidential information to withstand the beating of sticks, stones, insults, dynamite blasts, and hunger that the seat of government and part of Bolivia are suffering, without applying emergency measures. We assume, as could hardly be otherwise, that this information reflects a particular assessment of the Armed Forces.

It is possible (though he will never say so) that he distrusts the military. He may believe that involving the Army in the political disorder through a state of siege or emergency would encourage de facto ambitions, reveal differing views within the High Command, and, furthermore, that the recruits themselves might disobey their superiors given that a large portion of the troops are of indigenous origin, as has always been the case, but now with a much greater political influence than existed before. One should not forget that Evo Morales called for an opening at the Military College to admit cadets without any prior requirements, preferably those born in the Chapare.

In other words, the Armed Forces are training in the use of weapons those who will become their adversaries. That is fatal. We have seen what happened at the Ninth Division in the Cochabamba tropics, which was disgraceful and has left us deeply concerned, because rebellious individuals allowed themselves to carry out an “inspection” of the barracks, a level of audacity unique in the world.

The other factor that may be preventing the President of the Republic from ordering a state of siege—which has always been enacted by decree—is as serious as the first. It could be that the Armed Forces lack the capacity to remove the blockades, which have now appeared across the country like smallpox, mainly in the west.

The only people who know the actual condition of the Army are those who command it. They will have informed the head of state, through the Minister of Defense or the Commander-in-Chief, whether they have the necessary troops, weapons, ammunition, vehicles, dry rations, and fuel for an operation lasting no less than a week, followed by several more weeks of stabilization. It is the mid- and high-ranking military officers who know all of this, not us. But the troubling aspect is that the information reaching the president also reaches, in full detail, Evo Morales and the new leaders emerging in El Alto and the city of La Paz.

Mentioning a state of emergency or siege in our society seems barbaric, something consigned to history and worthy only of coup-plotting military officers. However, those who think this way offer no solution to the current chaos, in which La Paz is surrounded, its few access routes blocked, without food, fuel, or medicines, while thugs from the “red ponchos” and other groups throw dynamite, control the streets, and, worst of all, demand the resignation of President Paz Pereira, who has been in office for only six months.

If these fanatics do not want dialogue and fail to honor the agreements they reach, La Paz and the rest of the country cannot endure any more deceitful charades. Neither Santa Cruz nor Cochabamba can afford the luxury of remaining shut in for weeks with their economies paralyzed and their populations outraged. Therefore, after the government’s efforts at dialogue have failed twenty times over—even when the Church itself is mocked—only two options remain, both risky. Either the thousands or millions of citizens trapped by the blockades will rise up against the handful of insurgents, causing serious damage, or a state of siege will be declared and the state security forces—military and police—will leave their barracks to dismantle the blockades and arrest their leaders. The first of them, Evo Morales.

No nation in the world can live under permanent blockades and the constant threat of street violence. Those that do exist—no more than three or four—are the so-called failed states, such as Somalia and Yemen, and a couple of others like Haiti and the Congo, for example. In those nations—reduced to little more than territories—violence prevails, there is no control over the land, hunger spreads, and no one knows who is in charge. Bolivia is not yet a failed state, but it is on its way to becoming one. It is heading toward an explosion and toward the multiplication of the Chapare republic twentyfold. Then the adventure of the Plurinational State will have come to an end.