Dollar 101: Devaluing and freeing the exchange rate? | ¿Devaluar y liberar el tipo de cambio?

By Antonio Saravia, El Diario:

The Defense of the Fixed Exchange Rate

Think about any transaction you made in the market last week. Did you buy tomatoes at the supermarket? Did you sell your old cell phone? Did you go to a restaurant? Did you collect your salary? Question: in what currency did you conduct those transactions? I imagine you did so in Bolivianos, correct? But, although these transactions physically involved an exchange of our bills, did you really make those transactions in Bolivianos? It’s not a trick question. The answer we all know perfectly well: no, although nominally the transactions were done in Bolivianos, the transactions are always done in dollars. Let me explain.

A transaction is possible if, and only if, what we receive in exchange provides us with a value greater than what we originally had. You will only sell your old cell phone if the value you receive in exchange is greater than the benefit you perceive from keeping it. But how do we measure that value? The only way to do this is with a currency that retains it efficiently and predictably. That currency has been, in recent decades, the dollar. Although the transactions were made, then, in Bolivianos, you always made the conversion to dollars in your head. You are not interested in knowing that you were paid Bs. 500 for your old cell phone; you want to know how many dollars you can buy with that amount. The Boliviano is, in reality, a distraction. At the end of the day, we all carry a calculator in our heads and think in dollars instinctively because we are interested in protecting the value of our effort and property.

The calculator we carry inside was easy to use over the last 12 years because the exchange rate was fixed, and dollars were easy to obtain. We divided everything by 7, and that’s it. During that time, the government proudly raised its nationalist flag and boasted about having “Bolivianized” the economy and that it was no longer necessary to base our transactions on the empire’s currency. But it was just propaganda. The economy was, in reality, and as always, dollarized. Indeed, our transactions and bank deposits were mostly in Bolivianos, but that was because we knew the exchange rate was immovable, and dollars could be obtained without major problems. People trusted the Boliviano only because it was anchored to the dollar. We see that perfectly today. The minute dollars started to be scarce and the exchange rate rose in the parallel market, our patriotism and the famous “Bolivianization” ended, and we returned to seeking dollars desperately.

Keeping this reality always in mind is crucial to understanding why making the exchange rate more flexible does not solve the crisis or generate greater competitiveness. If the Central Bank of Bolivia were to declare a devaluation to close the exchange gap and then abandon the fixed exchange rate scheme, replacing it with a flexible one, the only thing that would happen is that we would intensively use the calculator again to know how many dollars we get with the Bolivianos we are paid. If a couple of years ago a vendor was willing to accept Bs. 14 for a kilo of tomatoes, it was because she knew those 14 Bolivianos represented $2 (remember, we are interested in the dollar as a store of value, not the Boliviano). If the exchange rate now rises to Bs. 14 (which is what we are reaching in the parallel market), the vendor will ask us for Bs. 28 for a kilo of tomatoes to protect herself and maintain the value of what she sells. In other words, prices will rise in the same (or almost the same) proportion as the rise of the dollar, because that is the currency to which we inevitably return to protect our income.

But if prices rise as the dollar price rises, the products do not become cheaper in that currency. That can happen in the short term while internal prices adjust, but eventually, they will rise again to represent the same dollars as before. Thus, devaluing does not generate greater competitiveness of our products compared to foreign products. Although the nominal exchange rate rises, the real exchange rate tends to remain constant. The only way to become really more competitive (raise the real exchange rate) is by increasing productivity, and that has to do with structural measures that involve institutionality, legal certainty, tax reduction, and regulations, etc. If nominal devaluations generated competitiveness, Venezuela would be the most competitive economy in the region.

Why have we reached such a high gap between the official exchange rate and the parallel exchange rate? Because the amount of dollars has been severely reduced concerning the amount of Bolivianos in the economy. This happens because we no longer receive the dollars we used to receive from gas sales and because the government did not reduce the monetary supply in Bolivianos to maintain the balance between these two currencies. For example, the monetary supply in Bolivianos increased by 18% last year, while our economy only grew by 3.1%. Why does the Central Bank increase the monetary supply instead of reducing it when it sees dollars are scarce? Because it has to cover the government’s fiscal deficits. With 11 consecutive years of fiscal deficits at a pace of 8% of GDP, the Central Bank has to print Bolivianos, eating into international reserves until reaching the point of having no more dollars.

What, then, is the solution? The solution is not to “sincere” the exchange rate by devaluing the official rate to Bs. 11, 12, or 14. That would mean welcoming underlying inflation with open arms (remember, once again, that vendors protect themselves against devaluation by raising prices) and generating expectations of more devaluations and higher inflation in the future. If the government increased the monetary supply to cover deficits in the past and had no better idea than to “sincere” the exchange rate by devaluing it, why wouldn’t it do so in the future?

No, the solution is not to devalue but to try to close the gap by lowering the parallel exchange rate to Bs. 6.96. This is achieved by lowering the demand for and/or increasing the supply of dollars. The first is achieved by stopping printing and withdrawing Bolivianos from the economy (by raising interest rates). That slows the demand for dollars because dollars can only be bought with Bolivianos. But to do that, fiscal deficits must be cut. This means strongly applying the brakes on spending and almost suddenly, which is undoubtedly recessionary. It is the adjustment that no one wants to make. The second is even more complicated. That requires creating conditions for exporters to export more and bring their dollars into the economy. Here structural measures are needed (legal security, tax reduction, reduction of labor regulations, etc.), but we could immediately start by completely releasing export quotas and by the complete and immediate release of fuel imports (without taxes) so that producers can produce and export.

In conclusion, devaluing and freeing the exchange rate solves nothing. It does not solve the crisis, which is essentially a fiscal crisis, and it does not make us more competitive because internal prices adjust, generating inflation. The solution is always the same: responsibility. Stop spending, even if it hurts in the short term.

Antonio Saravia holds a Ph.D. in Economics.

Twitter: @tufisaravia

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