Who is in charge in Bolivia | Quién manda en Bolivia

By Oscar Antezana, El Dia:

I don’t understand. Or rather, wasn’t the public already suspicious for years—or even taking it for granted—that the Chapare was infiltrated by organizations linked to drug trafficking, including networks of different nationalities? Didn’t President Paz and at least some of the presidential candidates know in far greater detail the scale of this problem?

For more than two decades we have seen indications, denunciations, and in many cases evidence. However, few dared to stir the waters too much. The reason was simple: sectors within the state apparatus itself were involved in that reality, including authorities in the judicial system. For this reason, it should not be surprising that narco-terrorism is financing the mobilization of thousands of demonstrators turned into instruments of political pressure for almost fifty days. Nor should it be surprising that groups based in the Chapare, both Bolivian and foreign, have access to modern weaponry of various calibers.

President Paz has demonstrated, at the very least, a worrying lack of vision and leadership in running the country. In seven months in office, beyond the increase in fuel prices at the beginning of his administration—a relatively simple measure because the population expected it and considered it necessary to normalize supply—he has little else to show. Yes, he raised the minimum wage, implemented temporary cash transfers under the PEPE program, to the detriment of the large fiscal deficit, and presented a deeply demagogic budget that seems more like a continuation of the previous government’s economic legacy than a real change of direction. There we have the evidence of drug-laced wood being transported and sold as if it were chicken.

The country’s lack of direction would be the product of a demagogic campaign that did not have—and still does not have, seven months after taking office—a governing plan; of its alliance with a PDC infiltrated by MAS supporters; and of its hesitation. In the midst of this vacuum and downward spiral, we Bolivians find ourselves.

Faced with road blockades and the increasingly open action of criminal structures linked to drug trafficking, an inevitable question arises: will the President continue asking or begging for dialogue while organized groups challenge the State?

The scale of the problem demands more than statements. The government should be designing a comprehensive strategy, including exploring mechanisms of international cooperation, to confront once and for all this scourge inherited from the years of Evo Morales and MAS. Acting alone would be extremely difficult. The Bolivian State has democratic legitimacy and constitutional backing, but its institutional and operational capacities are limited to confront criminal networks that operate with resources, logistics, and international connections.

No one should have illusions: those who control a multibillion-dollar business will not give it up voluntarily. They will defend their interests at any cost, even if that means more violence and more lives lost. Any intervention must be carefully planned, intelligence-driven, and above all, based on surprise. Current technology offers tools that did not exist before. Used correctly, they could reduce risks and increase the chances of success. If acted upon in an improvised manner, however, the human, social, and political consequences could be far more severe.

The time has come to confront one of the most damaging legacies left by Evo Morales and MAS. This is not solely a government task; it is a national challenge. Political leaders, institutions, and citizens should unambiguously support any initiative aimed at restoring state control over its territory and healing and saving the country from narco-terrorism.

If Bolivia manages to defeat this threat—and it must—this could become the legacy of the current President: a legacy that, so far, remains an unfulfilled promise for an increasingly disappointed population.

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