The Only Way Out | La única salida

Editorial, El Dia:

Bolivia is going through one of the deepest crises in its republican history. This is not an ordinary political crisis, the kind the country has managed to resolve through pacts, negotiations, and a measure of pragmatism. What is happening now is qualitatively different: it is the organized, violent, and desperate resistance of criminal structures that, for nearly two decades, colonized the Bolivian state and that today feel, for the first time in a very long time, that someone is finally closing in on them.

The report by the Milenio Foundation documents it rigorously, but anyone who knows Bolivia closely does not need statistics to understand it: the coca-grower unions of Chapare, the social organizations blocking highways, the leaders stirring up the masses are not merely transmission belts for organized crime. They are the social façade of a business worth billions of dollars that connects laboratories in the Bolivian tropics with the streets of São Paulo, Madrid, and Shanghai.

For twenty years, that system functioned according to a perverse but coherent logic: drug trafficking financed politics, politics protected drug trafficking, and both sheltered themselves under the banner of sovereignty and indigenous rights. The expulsion of the DEA in 2008 formally opened the back door. What Bolivia is experiencing today is not social protest. It is a criminal counteroffensive.

And here lies the core of the problem: there is no easy way out. No one should fool themselves into thinking that the resignation of President Rodrigo Paz would solve anything. On the contrary, it would be the clearest signal that organized crime in Bolivia holds veto power over governments. It would repeat the script that drug trafficking has rehearsed in other latitudes, with results we already know well: more impunity, deeper institutional penetration, and more violence.

The only real way out, the only one with any chance of success, is determined and unapologetic international cooperation. Daniel Noboa understood this in Ecuador when organized crime attempted to seize power outright, when a kingpin was flown out of prison by helicopter, and when television stations were stormed by armed men. Noboa did not negotiate. He declared an internal armed conflict, called on his allies, and struck back. Ecuador today is not a paradise, but neither is it Afghanistan.

Bolivia stands at that exact crossroads. If the Paz government yields to the pressure of criminalized streets, if it retreats from cooperation with the DEA, if it abandons the Shield of the Americas strategy, the country will not simply return to the MAS “normality.” It will fall into something worse: a narco-state without even the appearance of institutional order.

History does not forgive weakness in decisive moments. Bolivia today needs what it struggles most to accept: external assistance, international cooperation without euphemisms, and the determination not to surrender to those who mistake the streets for their own battlefield. The only way out is forward. And no one walks it alone.

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