Milei: His Economic Policies and Political Economy | Sus políticas económicas y economía política

By Oscar Antezana Malpartida, El Dia:

Milei and His Economic Policies

When Argentine President Javier Milei presented the first budget proposal of his administration after taking office in December 2023, he did so in person before Congress, turning the event into a partisan act. He freely criticized the opposition deputies and senators listening to him. His message was clear: fiscal surplus will solve all of Argentina’s problems, and the State should only concern itself with economic policy and security. “Any other issue can be resolved through the market or is the responsibility of subnational governments,” meaning the provinces, Milei said. The “other issues” included education, health, social security, and culture. “This budget will forever change the history of our country, so we can once again become the great Argentina we once were. After years of the political class restricting freedoms, we are here to put a leash on the State,” Milei declared.

The results from the first seven months of the year are mixed. On one hand, public spending was reduced, and the fiscal deficit was eliminated. Inflation also significantly decreased. Milei, a liberal economist, argues that inflation is a monetary phenomenon caused by an oversupply of money. To curb it, he cut monetary issuance (closing the tap) and eliminated the fiscal deficit through large public spending cuts. He maintains that now it’s just a matter of time. “Inflation is a technical issue that is already solved because we’ve done everything needed to fix it. Now we just need time to see inflation collapse,” said government spokesperson Manuel Adorni. The easiest part has been done. With the stroke of a pen, spending (and taxes) were cut, and the money-printing press was stopped—reminiscent of Bolivia’s Supreme Decree 21060 in 1985. So far, so good.

The downside is that the economy is shrinking, and no signs of recovery are on the horizon due to significant political and economic uncertainty. The economy contracted by 3.4% (Bolivia’s growth rate in 1986 was below -2.8%). Private consumption (-9.8%), driven by a loss in purchasing power, and investment (-29.4%) are the most discouraging figures in Argentina’s recession, which has now experienced three consecutive quarters of negative growth and could lead to serious stagflation. Economic agents are in a wait-and-see mode. The collapse in investment and consumption is weighing down the growth that President Milei had promised. Poverty, indigence, unemployment, and insecurity are all on the rise, along with public service tariffs, fuel prices, and tolls.

The consolidation of the partial success so far (zero deficit and lower inflation) depends on economic recovery. Moreover, recovery is critical for easing foreign exchange controls, reducing high external debt, and providing more room for maneuver in policy-making. Some critics argue that inflation has slowed amidst a severe recession. That might be the case, but we’ll have to see how prices react once the economy recovers (difficult to predict when), consumption rebounds, and the market, rather than the government, sets the price of the Argentine peso when current currency restrictions are lifted.

Milei was very clear both when he took office in December and when he opened Congress in March. He warned of tough times ahead, an inevitable shock, and that a hundred years of decline could not be reversed overnight. In this sense, the government could explain that the legacy it inherited was overwhelming, which is true. But we must also consider that 5.5 million people have fallen into poverty since Milei took office—the poverty rate has risen from 42% when he took charge of the government to 53%.

The numbers reveal the fragility of the Argentine economy, despite the optimism expressed by Milei and his economic team. The budget submitted by the executive to Congress for 2025 projects a GDP contraction of 3.8% for that year (-2.8% in Bolivia after Decree 21060), but a 5% rebound the following year (2.4% in Bolivia in 1987) and a similar percentage in 2026 (2.8% in 1988). We’ll see. According to official projections, the growth driver would be an export boom in the agricultural, oil, and mining sectors, within a context of a sharp drop in inflation to 18.3% annually. But patience, sooner or later, runs out. In any case, it is unlikely that an economy that has contracted more than 5% since Milei took office nine months ago will experience a “V-shaped” recovery, as projected; rather, it might resemble the Nike logo, as it did in Bolivia.

Some citizens are aware of the situation and believe that Milei has lifted the blindfold off millions of people who thought they were middle class but were not. “We are realizing that we were living a lie. That fuel is expensive, that utilities [electricity, gas, and water] are expensive, and that to pay less, we have to stop wasting and not leave the heating on all day to come home to a warm house. Prices have been adjusted, and we realized we were a fake middle class” (La Nación). Once that happens in Bolivia, where prices, starting with the exchange rate and gasoline, align with the market, the middle class might find itself just as economically battered.

It’s clear that time is not on the President’s side. The results have started to impact his popularity levels.

It will be very difficult for Milei’s orthodox liberal and libertarian message to Congress in March to become a reality. The importance of political, social, institutional, and economic contexts is critical to achieving the desired success. In other words, attention must be paid to political economy, not just economic policies, and this seems to be a challenge for Milei’s government. Tomorrow, in a following article, we will address this issue.

Milei and Political Economy

Javier Milei, the President of Argentina, is an economist by profession and a staunch libertarian. As an economist, he has shut off the monetary emission pipeline in line with those of us who studied under the monetarist school paradigm of Milton Friedman in the 70s and 80s. As a libertarian, libertarian doctrine has served as a powerful ideological guide for the public policies of monetarism and the free market, which the 1976 Nobel Prize winner so strongly advocated. Additionally, this rhetoric was tremendously effective in stirring the emotions of the population during the electoral campaign, while consistently hammering away with figures that demonstrated Argentina’s disastrous economic situation.

But “playing the guitar is a different story.” Reality is much more complex because economics is a social science, and as such, it is based on human behavior. The libertarianism he preaches is impossible to implement because it does not fit the reality of any country. For example, taxes cannot be abolished; a country needs a government, albeit a limited one, for the state to function. And a poor country cannot ignore the basic needs of at least certain segments of its population. Public education and health cannot be defunded; these two are pressing needs, particularly in small and poor economies like Bolivia’s.

As I’ve said before, development is too serious to be entrusted solely to economists. Development is more than just economics; it involves historical, cultural, sociological, and other factors. Just as being the president of France or Bolivia is not the same, the implementation of the same policies is not necessarily feasible or yields the same results in one country as in another. That is, how to apply economic policies within a specific social, institutional, and political context, aiming for their sustainability, carries serious nuances. At present, Milei seems to ignore the importance of political economy.

Economics goes hand in hand with politics, and Milei primarily faces a political challenge. Let’s look at a couple of real and current examples. Opposition Argentine politicians question the budget adjustments aimed at reducing the fiscal deficit as being unequal: funding to 57 public universities, where over two million students study, was cut by more than a third, while taxes for the wealthiest were reduced, and enormous benefits were granted to large corporations. Thus, through their protests, the academic community managed to halt the drastic cuts, and now, with parliamentary backing, they have taken a step towards recovering the lost funds. Nonetheless, protests continue. Another example: President Milei’s government attempted to privatize the national airline, but Congress opposed it. Frustrated by this, the government ordered a severe cut in funds. Unions called strikes. The conflict has escalated, with both sides hardening their positions. In less than four weeks, workers have undertaken seven strikes, including several undercover ones that have left thousands grounded and caused millions in losses. However, it was recently announced that Milei would sign a decree declaring Aerolíneas Argentinas subject to privatization.

With minimal representation, holding just 15% of the Lower House, Milei’s party needs political and congressional support, in particular, to implement reforms. Otherwise, the task becomes extremely difficult. And Argentina, like Bolivia, does not need a five-year liberal government; that’s too short a time to reverse the damage done to their economies. Argentina and Bolivia need a government (or governments) with legislative backing, strong and firm leadership that enforces the law rigorously, and implements liberal policies grounded in reality for more than ten years.

The absence of leadership options should not lead the first libertarian president in Argentina’s history to believe he has a blank check. That’s how populists think, in this case, right-wing ones – like Trump, Bolsonaro, and Bukele, among others. The Argentine president amended a law by decree and restricted access to public information. Besides being inconsistent with liberal and libertarian policies, this is a mistake. It’s the first step in limiting fundamental rights granted by a full democracy and a country under the rule of law.

Milei’s main problem, as in the case of Bolivia, is not economic; it’s political. Opposition candidates know, some more than others, that liberal economic policies need to be implemented. The challenge lies in the “how,” regarding scope, depth, and timing. Bolivia has changed a great deal since 1985 when Supreme Decree 21060 of the New Economic Policy was applied. To mention just two drastic differences: back then, there was tin, and now there’s no gas; there were imperfect but functioning democratic institutions, and now everything is dismantled.

There is much we should have learned from that and other more recent experiences in other countries; the most current and closest example is Argentina. That’s why I mentioned in a previous article that the challenge for the political opposition in Bolivia, whoever they may be or however they form for the 2025 elections, is not just to win but to win overwhelmingly in order to have a strong representation in Congress and be able to carry out necessary reforms. A first step is not electing that “one” opposition candidate; rather, it’s about directing all of the opposition’s artillery at the hearts and minds of the citizens and cornering the ruling party.

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