Agreements that do not solve the crisis | Acuerdos que no resuelven la crisis

By German Huanca Luna, Urgente.bo:

The proposals put forward in meetings with the business sector and previously with mayors and governors will not solve Bolivia’s economic crisis. These are agreements that lead nowhere, and the government is not taking responsibility for implementing economic measures to address the root of the problem.

The current economic crisis in Bolivia originates from the fiscal deficit since 2014, where expenses have exceeded income, and it has been deepened by the balance of payments deficit, where imports surpass exports, making access to dollars impossible. Therefore, it is the current “social, community, and productive economic model” implemented by MAS that is in crisis, does not work, and needs to be changed.

In the meeting with governors and mayors last June, the government’s main objective was to create a list of projects, credit rescheduling, and price controls, which, in general, project more debt. At no point did governors and mayors object to the projects funded by external financing, and the government used this to generate pressure on the Plurinational Legislative Assembly for the approval of more credits.

Similarly, the agreements reached in the latest economic dialogue between the government and business sectors aim to maintain business contracts with the state and, indirectly, to obtain some dollars by pressuring the Plurinational Legislative Assembly for more loans to address fuel purchases. However, they do not address the crisis in a structural way. This 17-point agreement mainly focuses on providing dollars via international credit, which means dollars will be provided and made available in the BCB’s international accounts, helping YPFB pay for fuel purchases. This immediately raises the question: How will those dollars be introduced into the Bolivian economy for the projects to be approved? These projects will be executed in Bolivianos, meaning they will necessarily be financed with monetary issuance, which implies higher price inflation. This indicates that both businessmen and politicians have only prioritized their interests—the former to maintain state contracts and the latter to reach the 2025 elections.

To resolve the crisis, an IMF loan is necessary, aimed at addressing the Balance of Payments crisis. With this, Bolivia would have a provision of dollars not only in the BCB’s international accounts but also for a cash transfer (by plane) to provide the financial system with a stock of cash dollars. This loan could range from $5 billion to $10 billion. Unfortunately, this type of loan requires high expertise in its management, openness to foreign investment, modification of the labor regulatory framework, and a plan for managing specialized financing, and this government lacks the human resources to do so. This necessarily implies a change in the economic model.

Finally, there have already been several meetings between social, business, and government sectors, but the country has not witnessed a technical meeting where solutions are presented to solve the problem at its root. The agreements were simply a “token gesture” while Bolivians get used to fuel queues and the search for dollars for international trade. Bolivia needs a change in its economic model, one that attracts foreign investment, generates decent employment, and integrates national businesses into the international dynamics, which today are driven by information technology, IT, and data. Simply acquiring more debt to buy fuel will not solve the economic crisis, which deepens with each passing day.

(*) Master in Financial Economics

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