Requiem for the most corrupt gov ever!

Follows excerpts from an article that captures most of the events and turmoil we had to endure to get rid of the coca grower caudillo. Article fails to describe how frightened was the Bolivian population with the hordes of masistas who walked down the street of La Paz, at night, banging doors, pillaging and burning public and private property alike. Article goes covering on the macro level what happened but fails big time assessing the real threat to our lives, one example here should suffice: If the Senkata gasoline and gas deposits would have blown to pieces, there would have been at least ten thousand death, nothing ever seen before. And the relatives and political groups aligned with the coca caudillo are now demanding compensation … what about the threat to kill thousands?! Why the left-aligned press and some academicians like the ones who wrote this article, neglect to show? Bolivia got rid of a narcotraffick supporter and corrupt government. The fight is not over, we need to eradicate this social cancer to rebuild our Republic.

Here is an excerpt of the article and the link so you can read it in full:


Was there a coup d’état? 

That is what the MAS government assured since the conflict began. However, for the most part, the claims substantiating this were generic. Even in the most critical moments, when detailed information could have influenced the sympathies of the protesters on either side, Morales did not take the opportunity to explain how the alleged coup was being rolled-out. Why not use the occasions he had to convince the population of the coup instead of using them to poke fun at the mobilized? 

The Minister of the Presidency, Juan Ramón Quintana, who attended the School of the Americas, dedicated his time to talking about a fearsome plan to turn Bolivia into a new Vietnam. It was the Minister of the Interior, Carlos Romero, who dedicated a few minutes to talking about the coup. He said that it “has three fundamental devices. The first is the violation of the constitutional guarantees of citizens, including freedom of expression and freedom of the press. Second, the activation of a racist sentiment to generate confrontation at the level of the civilian population of Bolivia and third, the violent confrontation against state institutions, particularly the Police.” 

Romero’s statement, which remained quite general, was made on November 4, when the “coup” was already two weeks old. When he went into detail, he mentioned that the opposition had acquired “weapons and ammunition in the United States” for this purpose. A blog in English seems to have been the source of his assertions. Apart from this, the government’s various statements about the so-called coup at that time served mainly as fodder for comical memes. In fact, the MAS government had adopted the practice of labelling mobilizations against it a “coup d’état,” most of the time without any basis, on various occasions during the past decade. Also missing was an accusatory or a defamatory campaign against the supposed “coup plotter,” Luis Fernando Camacho, as would normally arise during these circumstances. It was evident that at that time, Camacho wasn’t even on the government’s radar. 

How would it have been possible for coup plotters to create the climate that generated collective anger immediately following the elections? How would they have caused the TSE to suspend the counting of the votes? How would they have managed to do it almost at the same moment that Morales suspiciously declared himself winner? In order to achieve this, it would have been necessary for the opposition at least to have controlled one or both of the companies involved in the elections process, either the software provider or the computer auditor, and that the companies take the risk in this adventure. But even if that were the case, how could the opposition have managed to avoid the TSE and the government from detecting its maneuvers in the months of preparation of the elections? Only inconceivable errors and myopia could explain such a situation. Although it is not possible to rule this scenario out completely, it seems to be no more than a remote possibility. 

Was there fraud? There are many indications that suggest this. In July 2015, the composition of the TSE was completely renewed when the MAS-controlled Legislative Assembly appointed six new members, and President Morales appointed one. After the 2018 resignations of the so-called “institutionalist” TSE members under political pressure, the ruling party appointed members who, according to 7 Control Ciudadano 

the press, had been linked in the past to the MAS (Antonio Costas remained as the only “institutionalist” TSE member). The same TSE member who declared that the results were “sacred” following October’s elections was photographed painting walls in favor of MAS during previous elections. 

Costas himself said that the period after the new members were named was marked by a series of dismissals and changes in officials. In the meantime, on November 28, 2017, the Constitutional Court provided an interpretation of the Constitution, with legal maneuvers common among charlatan lawyers, that Morales and García Linera have the “human right” to run for another term, thus ignoring the result of the referendum held on February 21, 2016. In that referendum, which took place against the backdrop of an unfolding soap opera, the population voted against a constitutional modification that would otherwise have enabled their candidacy for a possible third reelection. 

On December 4, 2018, this process culminated with the granting of final approval by the government-controlled TSE of the eligibility of both candidates for the 2019 elections. In addition to this, it is important to highlight the following irregularities: that there was a supposed unusual increase in the electoral roll; that notaries from Pando were found flagrantly enrolling citizens in Riberalta, which is part of another electoral district; that a single company was authorized to transmit the results from exit polls; that there were resignations of members and officials of the electoral departmental tribunals the days immediately after the election; and finally, that the silence of the TSE was deafening during weeks when it was imperative to hear the technical voice of the institution in order to clarify doubts about the electoral process. 

Considering that polls in the year leading up to the election indicated that the MAS was leading but did not exceed 50 per cent of the votes or a 10 per cent difference over their second-place rivals, many in the country believed that the government had planned to manipulate the election if necessary. Both preliminary OAS reports came to confirm what mobilized citizens had presumed since the night of the election. 

The MAS, as a party structure, was unable to generate leaders who could have taken the baton from the Morales-García Linera duo, or perhaps this was not attempted. When Santos Ramírez was sentenced to jail due to corruption scandals in the state oil company, the path for Morales’s natural successor was closed. Similarly, when former Foreign Affairs Minister David Choquehuanca was cast aside as a delegate to the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) in 2017, Morales remained as the sole presidential candidate. 

The MAS, then, found itself in a dead end created by the very Constitution it had approved in 2009, which prohibited the re-election of the president and vice-president for more than one continuous term (Article 168). Morales and García Linera considered themselves irreplaceable and forced the way for a possible fourth consecutive term. García Linera himself had said that without Morales “the sun will hide, and the moon will escape.” When the election arrived, they knew that they could not win in the first round and that if they didn’t and the election went to a run off, they would lose to Carlos de Mesa and his running mate. On October 20, they bet on suicide.”

“Perhaps the most lasting consequence of the recent political crisis is not the fall of the political project of the national majorities, the fall of their government, but rather the decomposition of the social organizations themselves. Not only did the MAS state and party apparatuses collapse in this process, it is possible that the clientelist union structure will do so as well. Like wood rotting from the inside, it too is disintegrating with the impact of the crisis. This has become apparent, particularly in El Alto, which looks today more like a hydra with many heads trying to quickly reorganize, disregarding, in some cases, the MAS and opposition leaders. Reorganization requires new leadership, as only once the weeds are pulled out will crops grow. The stupor of election day produced disorganization; and the violence of “democracy,” in turn, despair. 

Pride hinders judgement. The man who kneed a journalist in front of many cameras during a soccer game is the same man who believed he could commit electoral fraud without anyone noticing. The MAS leaders drank too much from the goblet of power and got drunk from it. They did not recognize their mistakes, they ignored a referendum and reacted late to the great fire in the Chiquitanía; they harshly repressed those who challenged them, including the leaders of social organizations who once supported them; it is they, in short, who created the conditions of their own defeat. 

And they are the ones who gave a political opportunity to the right and to the truly conservative sectors who now venture out. After a decade of wage increases, improvement of the living standard of national majorities, extraordinary profits for industrialists, merchants and banks, as they themselves said, in a time of “economic growth and stability,” the MAS had the best prospects to continue governing the country for several more years, if they had not stubbornly forced the candidacy of the irreplaceable men. 

After several years, the political opposition did not yet have the necessary strength, nor the program required to be a real opposition. In their obstinacy, believing themselves irreplaceable, the leaders of the MAS did not mind pitting workers and peasants against the middle classes, as if in a boxing-ring. It is they who bet on the civil confrontation to resolve the dispute. It is they who replicated and expanded the champa guerra (war among people of humble means), as Bolivian sociologist Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui would say, just as it was incited by the MNR during its decline in the 1960s. It is they who opened the doors to the reconstitution of the conservative forces: just as in 1964, the conservative reaction arrived in November. Morales and García Linera are the ones who are truly responsible for this gigantic social and political disaster. History will judge them. 

A political cycle has closed and its requiem must be played. Political processes rarely fit into prefabricated ideological schemes and must be considered in their complexity. We cannot look to the future without facing the mistakes of the past. When the global economic crisis, which has been in fermentation during these past years and in relation to which the economic policies of the MAS government have made the country more vulnerable, finally occurs, other songs will be played. We will have to travel new paths. For now, it is time to reorganize, to clean house. For those abroad, international solidarity must be not with he who wanted to be the supreme leader, the caudillo, but with social movements during their painful process of reorganization and in defense of the social gains they’ve acquired over past years.”

The link for the whole document is here

Published by Bolivian Thoughts

Senior managerial experience on sustainable development projects.

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