The Altiplano Jihad | La Jihad altiplánica

By Diego Ayo, Brujula Digital:

Hearing a peasant announce that “we are going to carpet the La Paz-Oruro highway with corpses” is dramatic. It is even worse when a pair of lawmakers openly devote themselves to issuing threats without the slightest shame.

Nilton Condori states that “if we are going to change the Political Constitution of the State, we have to reform it in order to execute these political thieves by firing squad.” His colleague Rómulo Villca is no less extreme: “No disgusting q’ara is going to shoot at my people,” he declared in reference to the “Croats from Santa Cruz.”

I have no doubt that these verbal outrages should fall under the Penal Code. However, the judicial outlook is not what interests this reflection, but rather understanding how these authorities, along with many other radicalized leaders, are adapting themselves to this moment. A historical moment of territorial isolation now being experienced by Evo Morales.

He lives hidden in the Chapare, and that certainty makes us believe he is already defeated. Wrong! He is not. In reality, seeing himself cornered by justice, Morales has resorted to his last stronghold of absolute power: the rural/peasant populations.

In psychological terms, a leader of Evo Morales’ magnitude develops what the psychology of power calls identity fusion: Bolivia and he become one and the same.

Let us remember that, for centuries, the indigenous population felt that the State was a hostile entity that came to take away their land, their coca, their dignity. Evo Morales was seen as the opposite: a shield preventing that hostility from continuing. Consequently, collective psychology processes that, if the shield is destroyed, they themselves would be stripped of the State and left defenseless.

From this perspective, any accusation against the leader is not seen as an act of justice but as an attack by the system against the indigenous movement itself. In that scenario, the behavior of the people closest to Evo does not moderate itself — it becomes hyper-radicalized.

I repeat: when that leader who once commanded millions ends up entrenched exclusively within his historical bastions, the behavior of his “soldiers” turns radical. Morales’ final battle, therefore, is not experienced as the pursuit of an institutional victory — it is lived as an epic of resistance.

At this stage, moderates flee or are expelled. Only the “true believers” remain. The psychological bond becomes mystical: marching across the Altiplano in the cold, resisting tear gas, blocking a highway for weeks is no longer done for an economic subsidy, it is done for the survival of the plurinational myth. In summary: the transition from the grandiose (the presidency) to the minimal (isolation in the Chapare) does not weaken the hard core — it transforms it into a dogmatic faction. And that is what we are seeing today in the Altiplano. We also see it in circles of fanatical MAS loyalists deeply opposed to democracy.

Let us go back and compare. When the movement was large and powerful, from 2000 onward, it attracted many people. There was a respectable space for debate. The situation began to change when Morales started losing power, eventually reaching this year, 2026. The loyalists fled, demonstrating the limits of their loyalty. Who remained? His bases: those who today are carrying out the blockades. Evo ultimately withdrew into his most loyal core once he no longer enjoyed the proximity to State power that he had for 20 years and found himself entrenched in Villa Tunari.

What happened? A natural purge: the moderates, the bureaucrats, and the pragmatists fled because the cost of remaining became excessively high — losing jobs, facing legal prosecution, being injured in marches. Who stayed behind? Only the peasant militants.

With the moderates gone, there is no one left to say, “we should be careful, this measure is too extreme” or “we should negotiate.” No longer. The population geographically barricaded in the Altiplano becomes homogeneous. And that is not even the most remarkable part. In truth, within a group where everyone thinks alike, the only way to stand out is by being the most radical. One must be radical against the enemy government in La Paz!

This is a population that has already broken contact with the reality of the rest of the country. They no longer listen to national news broadcasts or read the press. They only hear their own community radio stations. Within that echo chamber, rumors of “persecution,” “imminent massacre,” and “plans to destroy the indigenous movement” have multiplied and are accepted as absolute truths.

As that brutal collective paranoia feeds itself, launching an indefinite blockade, resisting with dynamite, confronting the police, ceases to be viewed as insanity and instead comes to be seen as a sacred and heroic duty.

Within this core of exacerbated fundamentalism, we find the concept of martyrdom. For these hyper-radicalized populations, fighting for the leader is experienced as a badge of honor. It bears repeating: once Evo is no longer the State, his power is reestablished in these territories as an untouchable deity.

The transition from the grandiose to the minimal does not extinguish the fire. In reality, it compresses the fuel, transforming what was once a powerful political movement lasting approximately two decades into a dogmatic faction willing to burn everything down before surrendering.

We cannot allow it.

Diego Ayo holds a PhD in political science.

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