The deepest limit to development in Bolivia: its institutions | El límite más profundo del desarrollo en Bolivia, sus instituciones

By Oscar Antezana:

Throughout this series we have explored different dimensions of economic development in Bolivia: the false dilemma between state and market, the persistent illusion of “miracle resources,” the accumulation of directionless projects, and the need to project a strategy beyond borders. The diagnosis seems clear: Bolivia does not lack opportunities; it lacks a strategy. But that diagnosis, on its own, is incomplete. There is a deeper limit, less visible and harder to confront. A limit that does not appear in speeches, yet determines all outcomes. That limit is institutions. Without strong institutions, no strategy—no matter how brilliant—survives. It dissolves, becomes distorted, or simply fails.

In previous articles we pointed out that Bolivia has not clearly defined what type of economy it wants to build. We also saw how that absence translates into resource dependency, scattered investments, and a weak international presence. However, even if those problems were resolved—if the country managed to organize its priorities, coordinate its investments, and project itself strategically to the world—it would inevitably run into a tougher wall: its institutional capacity to sustain what it decides.

Strategy does not die in design. It dies in execution. And in Bolivia, execution is the weakest link. Trust in key institutions is limited, and in some cases nonexistent. The justice system carries persistent doubts about its independence. Public administration, far from renewing itself, retains “masista” inertia that affects its functioning. Subnational governments operate with insufficient technical capacity. Projects are delayed, budgets go unspent, decisions dissolve into opaque administrative processes. Whatever the case, translating plans into results is difficult.

But the deepest problem is not in public offices. It lies in how society functions. Bolivia is, essentially, an informal economy. More than half of its productive activity takes place outside the law—not as an exception, but as the norm. This is not simply an economic problem; it is an institutional symptom. It signals something more troubling: complying with the law is not always rational. When rules are not enforced, or are applied selectively, they cease to be rules. They become optional references. And in that environment, predictability disappears. Without predictability, there is no investment. Without investment, there is no transformation.

A suggestion to the government, I insist: carry out a massive and permanent awareness campaign about our forgotten values—such as honesty, punctuality, keeping one’s word, effort, and compliance with the law—and strengthen our patriotism so that we understand and accept the sacrifices we must all make and endure the difficult days ahead. Shared values have the capacity to unite us, to shape how a society functions. For years, even decades, we have been fragmented, splintered.

In this context, the political debate—more state or more market—loses meaning. Not because it is unimportant, but because it is secondary. Before debating the model, the underlying problem must be confronted: institutional weakness. This is not about destroying what exists or starting from scratch. It is something more complex: reforming, correcting, rebuilding trust. Strengthening what still works and confronting, without evasion, what does not. But that process is slow, uncomfortable, and, above all, politically costly.

International experience is clear. Countries that achieve development are not necessarily those with the most resources, but those that manage to build institutions that work. Predictable states. Systems where the law is upheld. Societies where trust is not the exception. Bolivia is far from that point—and that distance has a cost.

At this stage, the question is no longer economic, nor even political. It is a more uncomfortable question: can a country move forward when no one trusts anyone? Distrust not only weakens the state; it disarticulates society. It affects everyday decisions, limits cooperation, and erodes any attempt at collective action. And without cooperation, development becomes impossible.

If the beginning of this series raised the need for a strategy, this conclusion exposes its harshest condition. Without solid and credible institutions, no strategy survives. Because development does not fail only due to bad decisions—it fails when a country loses the capacity to turn them into reality.

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