Bolivia: The country that benefits from its migrants, but does not think about them | El país que se beneficia de sus migrantes, pero no piensa en ellos

By Windsor Hernani, Vision 360:

Bolivia’s problem is not only the lack of foreign currency, but also the absence of a policy that considers those who generate it—not only exporters, but migrants as well.

Projections from the International Monetary Fund outline an adverse economic scenario for Bolivia: a contraction of -3.3% of GDP, inflation above 20%, and a deterioration in employment that could raise the unemployment rate to 4.5%.

In this context, it is reasonable to foresee that hundreds of Bolivians from various social strata—especially young people and those with lower incomes—will seek to migrate to other countries in search of opportunities.

According to the latest population and housing census, between 2001 and 2024 Bolivian emigrants are mainly concentrated in Argentina (32.9%), followed by Spain (18.7%), Chile (17.8%), Brazil (16.0%), and the United States represents only 4.5%. This is therefore a predominantly regional migration, since more than 67% go to neighboring countries and are linked to economies with relatively lower productivity.

In contrast, when analyzing the origin of remittances—according to data from the Central Bank of Bolivia—the map changes radically. Spain, with approximately 30%, and the United States, with 26%, lead the flows, while Argentina loses relevance. This divergence confirms a central fact: there is no direct correlation between the number of emigrants and the volume of remittances. The decisive variable is not quantitative but qualitative: income, labor formalization, and financial inclusion in the destination country are the determining factors.

The result is a structurally inefficient equation. Bolivia exports population to economies with relatively lower productivity and depends, in terms of foreign currency, on economies where it has a smaller presence but a greater capacity to generate income. This is the first distortion.

The second, and more serious, is internal, structural, and must necessarily be corrected because it inappropriately penalizes those who, far from their land and loved ones, seek to move forward. It is the current exchange-rate regime, which establishes that every dollar entering through the financial system must be converted into bolivianos at the official exchange rate (Bs 6.97), lower than its real market value. In practical terms, the migrant and their family lose purchasing power by using the formal channel. The response of emigrants is rational: avoid the system. Transfers through travelers, family networks, and informal mechanisms replace the banking system, with the risks that this entails.

In this scenario, the geographic variable is decisive. Proximity to Argentina, Chile, and Brazil facilitates the use of informal channels, while the distance to Spain or the United States leaves no alternative but to use formal mechanisms, despite the loss of value and transaction costs involved.

From the above, a first conclusion is that the Central Bank’s statistics record only a part of the real flow of remittances, while a growing proportion of foreign currency circulates outside the financial system. Instead of strengthening intermediation, the current policy weakens it, and the sad part is that there is no association of emigrants to represent them, as banks have—through Asoban—and the government seems unconcerned about this unequal relationship. That is not negligence. It is institutionalized cynicism. And as long as this continues, the country will not have a dollar crisis: it will have a crisis of coherence.

In summary, the decisive factor remains the economic incentive: when the system penalizes the migrant, the migrant avoids the system.

It is unfortunate, but although Bolivia benefits from remittances and needs them, it does not create equitable conditions to channel them efficiently. The underlying problem is the absence of a state policy toward the Bolivian diaspora.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the entity responsible for developing a policy for migrants, but it maintains a purely administrative consular approach; that is, it limits its functions to issuing documents such as certificates, passports, and others. The migrant is seen only as a subject of consular protection, not as a strategic economic actor.

It is necessary to incorporate new mechanisms of assistance and consular advisory services in financial matters. The example to follow is Mexico, which, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Institute of Mexicans Abroad, and in coordination with CONDUSEF (National Commission for the Protection and Defense of Financial Services Users—equivalent to ASFI), has developed an active policy of financial inclusion for its diaspora. Mexico not only benefits from remittances; it integrates them into its development strategy.

Bolivia’s problem is not only the lack of foreign currency, but the lack of a policy that considers those who generate it—not only exporters, but migrants as well.

The solution does not require inventing anything new, but rather stopping the pretense. It is necessary to correct the exchange-rate distortion that penalizes migrants; to reconfigure a consular role that today reduces the diaspora to a line for obtaining documents; and to integrate those who send foreign currency into a true development strategy, not into a convenient narrative. Persisting in the current model is not simple bureaucratic inertia: it is a political decision that sustains an unsustainable contradiction. Bolivia benefits every month from the effort and distance of its migrants, yet refuses to think of them as strategic actors.

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