By Andrés Gómez, Visión 360:

It is essential for the state to guarantee the safety of people engaged in lawful economic activities in high-risk areas. Moreover, it must promote investment in productive projects in regions where drug trafficking is the primary source of income.

Two hitmen shot and killed Captain Juan Carlos Aldunate with seven bullets on Wednesday as he was leaving his home in his vehicle in the city of Santa Cruz. He was not just any police officer—he was part of the inner circle of Vice Minister of Interior Regime, Jhonny Aguilera, according to media reports that same day.

Aguilera is not just any official—he is a trusted figure within the MAS government. He has held key positions under the administrations of Evo Morales and Luis Arce and was implicated in the Las Américas Hotel massacre. When he served as general commander of the police, he included Aldunate in his security detail, as reported by El Día newspaper.

Given the way the assassination was carried out, public opinion immediately attributed it to drug trafficking. Possible motives: a settling of scores or a warning to government authorities. The crime closely resembles those ordered by drug lord Pablo Escobar in Colombia during the 1980s and early 1990s.

This event adds to other cases linking police officers to drug trafficking, the most recent being Maximiliano Dávila, who was extradited to the United States last December.

Evidence suggests that drug trafficking has infiltrated the state. A widely circulated statement on social media reads: the Plurinational State is a narco-state. If there were any doubts, another piece of evidence confirms it: drug traffickers control territories within the country.

In May 2023, El Deber reported on a “narco-paradise” known as “Paractito,” a community in the municipality of Villa Tunari in the Cochabamba tropics. Very few people are allowed entry. Police and military personnel are strictly prohibited, and if they dare to enter, they are met with gunfire. It is a region controlled by drug trafficking. Amid the dense vegetation, luxury stands out. This is where the “big fish” of Chapare live, surrounded by foreigners and extravagance similar to Colombia’s most notorious red zones.

“They bring cumbia groups from Mexico. Just recently, Los Bybys were there. They played at a private party for a drug lord. The locals know exactly what these people do. They are well protected. That night—March 1 of this year—we approached the house from one side and saw people armed with firearms. They kicked us out,” recounted an anti-drug officer to El Deber in December last year.

The same newspaper, in November 2024, published a report titled: “Chapare, Out of Control as Red Routes Expand.” A year earlier, in July 2023, they reported on another area controlled by drug traffickers.

“‘México Chico’ is part of one of Bolivia’s most dangerous routes. This community is three hours from the city of Oruro. It belongs to the municipality of Challapata and is part of the Qaqachaca community. There is no state presence there, and illegal activities are the norm. Smuggling stolen vehicles is commonplace, as is drug trafficking. Local criminal families have contacts with their counterparts in Chile, facilitating the entry of stolen cars and the sale of cocaine in northern Chile.”

The evidence is clear—drug cartels control entire regions of the Plurinational State. Most concerning is their presence in areas where 94% of coca production is diverted to the drug trade. The government of Luis Arce has done nothing to reclaim these areas from “narco-power.” Why?

What else does the “narco” control in Bolivia? Judges? Prosecutors? Magistrates? Does it finance political parties? Given the circumstances, the 2009 nationalization of the anti-drug fight has proven to be yet another failure of the so-called “process of change.”

Bolivia’s situation is dire. Drug trafficking thrives because the state is weak, corruption is rampant, and economic opportunities are scarce in certain coca-producing regions. What must be done? The answer is obvious: regain control of the state. To achieve this, a change in government is urgent.

Recovering effective territorial control alone will not suffice. The anti-drug forces must be purged. Their officers, in addition to being well-trained and equipped, must be strictly monitored to prevent corruption. The use of technology, informants, and international cooperation will be crucial, as the “narco” has already turned various countries into producers, transit hubs, distributors, or consumers.

Another essential step is enforcing existing laws to ensure coca reaches legal markets and is not diverted. How? Through technology. It is possible to monitor, in real-time, the movement of traders attempting to break the law. Such measures could benefit those who operate within legal boundaries.

The state must guarantee the security of people engaged in lawful economic activities in high-risk areas. Furthermore, it should promote investment in productive projects in regions where drug trafficking is the main source of income.

According to the latest reports, the hitmen who assassinated Captain Aldunate escaped from El Trompillo Airport in a small plane, registration CP-1860, which had previously been seized in a drug trafficking case but was returned to its owner last year by a judge’s order.

Why did the radars fail to detect and intercept that aircraft? In August 2016, Bolivia purchased 13 radars from the French company Thales, seven of them for military use. One of these radars was specifically designated to detect planes transporting drugs or drug traffickers. The contract cost $215 million. Why are they not working? Or does the “narco” control all aspects of national security?