What to Do with State-Owned Companies? | ¿Qué hacer con las empresas del Estado?

By Francesco Zaratti:

It is said that a Spanish farmer visited a convent and was amazed by the row of half-busts that adorned the cloister. While a friar explained that one was St. Peter, another St. Paul, and yet another St. Francis, the farmer couldn’t help but comment, “From the waist up, I too am a saint.”

That anecdote perfectly applies to Public Enterprises (EP) in Bolivia. “From the waist up,” or ideally, they enjoy sainthood, but “from the waist down,” in reality, they show three basic flaws: they are chronically indebted, they are deficit-ridden, and, above all, they are poorly managed. In fact, EPs represent one of the most dreadful legacies of nearly 20 years of populist governments.

Despite this, a recent survey showed that a large majority of Bolivians support the creation of more EPs, due to nationalist mythology that prevents an objective view of reality.

Let’s examine these flaws. The fact that a company is in debt shouldn’t per se be alarming. Many private companies operate based on bank loans that are renewed and increased as they grow and pay interest. The problem with EPs is that their debts to the State are unpayable because they operate in a constant state of deficit.

Being in deficit should not be demonized either: some EPs are inherently deficit-driven due to their community service role, funded by tax redistribution. For example, a company like Mi Teleférico fulfills a social function that is more important than maintaining a balanced budget. The same could be said for the Pumakatari buses or some basic services subsidized by national or municipal taxes. The problem is that these deficits tend to grow year after year because proper rate adjustments are not applied to keep them under control. In many countries, some basic services, such as transportation, are subsidized either directly (through institutional contributions) or indirectly (through fuel subsidies, as is the case with private transporters in Bolivia).

Finally, regarding poor management, this is the most damaging flaw of our EPs. Typically, the personnel called to lead (boards of directors) and manage (managers) EPs are chosen from the pool of the ruling party’s militants, with little or no experience, and without guarantees of continuity or independence. Hence, the numerous interim appointments.

In summary, paraphrasing President Luis Arce, the State has “happily” created, but “irresponsibly” failed to take care of EPs.

Critics of EPs suggest closing them, selling them, or turning them into mixed-capital companies. However, if they are closed, there is the social conflict of job loss. If they are sold, I assume it would not be easy to find private investors willing to buy inherently “sick” companies. The same applies to potential mixed companies if the rules on how to share management are not well defined.

From this, I deduce that the core issue of EPs is management. It’s not enough to repeat the saying that “the State is a poor manager” when it doesn’t even meet the basic criteria of a manager.

The reality is that EPs exist, the people love them, and making them disappear would be a massive challenge. Why not consider reaching a consensus on rules for managing EPs that would allow them to transition to more modern governance models?

In a future column, I will present some ideas on how to approach this issue, based on my experience as a Presidential Delegate, nearly 20 years ago.

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