By Antonio Saravia, Vision 360:

There is no viable solution to Bolivia’s fuel crisis other than opening the market and allowing private companies to participate without price controls or administrative barriers.

Last week, senators Branko Marinkovich, Ernesto Suárez and Kathia Quiroga submitted to the Senate a bill entitled the Law on the Freedom to Import, Store, Transport and Commercialize Liquid Fuels. Having reviewed the proposal carefully, I believe it appropriately addresses the urgent need to transfer the fuel import business from state control to the private sector. The initiative is intelligent, bold and points the country in the right direction. Its authors deserve recognition not only for presenting it, but also for their willingness to debate it openly with both lawmakers and the public.

The bill’s central objective is to establish a regime of free competition across virtually the entire downstream fuel chain: imports, storage, transportation, distribution and retail sales. Under the proposal, individuals and companies—whether domestic or foreign—would be able to import fuels without being subject to price controls or burdensome administrative restrictions. The expected outcome is a competitive marketplace in which multiple operators vie for consumers by offering the best combination of price and quality. In such an environment, profits depend on attracting customers rather than securing political favors.

The proposal would represent a structural break with the current system, under which a state monopoly frequently runs short of foreign currency to finance imports, is plagued by corruption scandals, and has produced the endless fuel lines that have become all too familiar across the country. The bill would also dismantle the web of bureaucratic restrictions imposed by the National Hydrocarbons Agency (ANH), an institution that would cease to exist under the new framework.

Importers would no longer need discretionary authorizations, operating licenses, quota allocations, import permits or sector-specific approvals. They would simply register in a national operators’ registry and comply with basic quality and safety standards. Once registered, they could sell directly to consumers at market prices and would not be required to channel their products through YPFB.

The bill also proposes a simplified tax regime. The only tax applicable to fuel imports and sales would be a 3 percent value-added tax—far below Bolivia’s standard 13 percent VAT. Other taxes, including the Special Hydrocarbons and Derivatives Tax (IEHD), customs duties, the Transactions Tax and the Corporate Income Tax, would not apply.

This is a sensible measure. Bolivia urgently needs to revive its productive sectors, and doing so requires making fuel as affordable as possible without relying on subsidies. Lower taxes can help achieve that goal. The objective should be to encourage producers to consume more fuel and expand output—not to maximize government revenue.

Another major strength of the proposal is the elimination of the ANH. The agency and its regulatory framework have significantly hindered the development of a private fuel import market. One example is Administrative Resolution No. 0031, which I discussed at length in a previous column. Under the bill, the ANH would be replaced by a Technical Authority for Fuel Quality and Safety, whose role would be limited to technical functions such as operator registration, quality verification, safety standards and metrology. The shift is clear: away from discretionary economic regulation and toward objective technical oversight.

Yet despite its many virtues, the bill is not without flaws.

The first is its decision to allow two markets to coexist: a free market supplied by private companies at market prices and a state-controlled market supplied by YPFB at regulated prices. Article 14 explicitly states that the free-pricing regime established by the law will coexist with regulated prices for domestically produced fuels.

This is problematic. If YPFB were to resume significant domestic fuel production and sell below market prices, it could quickly drive private competitors out of business. In effect, the state would be engaging in dumping or unfair competition.

Article 15 goes even further, allowing YPFB not only to market domestically produced fuels but also to continue importing fuels, as it does today. Although the bill includes safeguards intended to prevent unfair advantages—such as prohibiting transfers, cross-subsidies, state guarantees and preferential access to public credit—the nature of a state-owned enterprise makes genuine competition difficult to achieve.

Unlike private firms, a state company does not need to generate profits to survive. Its cost of capital is effectively zero. As a result, it can afford to sell at lower prices than private competitors while remaining financially viable. Even under the bill’s proposed safeguards, YPFB could operate under conditions that private firms simply cannot match.

For that reason, the only sustainable solution is to remove YPFB entirely from fuel imports and from the commercialization of domestically produced fuels. As long as the state remains an active competitor, the risk of unequal treatment will persist, undermining the legal certainty required to attract private investment.

The bill’s second weakness is the creation of a government body to certify the quality of imported fuels. Such an arrangement creates opportunities for discretion, political interference and corruption. A better alternative would be the emergence of a private certification market, in which importers could voluntarily seek independent verification of quality standards.

As with any product or service, consumers ultimately purchase a combination of quality and price. In a competitive market, firms would offer different combinations to appeal to different segments of consumers. Some would focus on premium quality at higher prices, while others would compete by offering lower-cost alternatives. A truly free market should allow consumers—not regulators—to decide which combination best meets their needs.

Beyond its strengths and weaknesses, however, the bill faces a much larger obstacle: Bolivia’s Constitution.

Article 361 of the Constitution states that YPFB is the only entity authorized to carry out activities throughout the hydrocarbons production chain and their commercialization. On its face, that provision alone could render the bill unconstitutional.

Yet Article 359 introduces a degree of ambiguity. It states that the State owns all hydrocarbon production in the country and is solely authorized to commercialize that production. One possible interpretation is that the constitutional monopoly applies only to fuels produced domestically, not to fuels imported from abroad. Furthermore, Article 378 explicitly allows private participation in the energy production chain.

These contradictions illustrate a broader problem: Bolivia’s Constitution is ambiguous, internally inconsistent and economically risky. Even if this bill were enacted, the likelihood of a constitutional challenge would remain high. Any company entering the market would do so under the constant threat that the legal framework could be overturned.

Nevertheless, the bill’s underlying vision is correct. There is no lasting solution to fuel shortages, poor-quality gasoline, smuggling and the risk of economic paralysis other than opening the market to private competition and removing price controls and administrative barriers. That is the structural answer to Bolivia’s energy crisis.

Achieving those goals, however, may require more than a new law. It may ultimately demand a profound reform of the Constitution itself.

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