Treaty Rights, Not Favors | Derechos de Tratado, No Favores

By Windsor Hernani, Vision 360:

Why ask for a favor when the 1904 Treaty recognizes it as a right?

If a restriction is truly unavoidable, the proper course is to negotiate with the other party, agree on mitigation mechanisms, and, if necessary, adopt compensatory measures. That is how international law works.

Article VI of the 1904 Treaty established Chile’s obligation to guarantee Bolivia, in perpetuity, free transit through its territory. Subsequent instruments, such as the 1937 Convention on Transit and others, clarified the scope of that obligation, establishing that it includes the broadest and most unrestricted circulation.

Moreover, during the proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Chile’s legal representatives spared no argument in attempting to demonstrate that the free-transit regime was so broad and unrestricted that there was no need to negotiate sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean with Bolivia. According to their position, Bolivia already enjoyed, in practice, access through the free-transit regime.

Free transit—together with £300,000 sterling—was the consideration Chile provided in 1904 in exchange for 120,000 square kilometers of Bolivia’s resource-rich coastline. Today, international law has evolved further. Free transit constitutes one of the fundamental pillars of international trade and economic relations among states. For that reason, the World Trade Organization has enshrined freedom of transit as an obligation for all states; none of them, however, surrendered part of their territory in exchange for it.

In a world where logistical supply chains connect entire continents, no country can turn its borders into obstacles to international trade. Modern borders delimit jurisdictions; they are no longer barriers.

Like any international obligation, free transit must be interpreted in accordance with the principles of international law. A state cannot recognize a right through a treaty and then strip it of substance through domestic measures that prevent or substantially hinder its exercise.

Two principles are particularly relevant. The first is the principle of effectiveness (effet utile), under which treaty provisions must be interpreted so that they produce practical effects rather than being reduced to merely formal promises. The second is the principle prohibiting frustration of a treaty’s object and purpose, according to which no state may adopt measures that deprive freely assumed international obligations of their practical effectiveness.

Therefore, it is not enough to formally recognize free transit if recurrent closures, restricted operating hours, or administrative decisions generate systematic delays, long queues, and significant obstacles to the movement of goods. Under such circumstances, the right becomes distorted in practice.

International law protects not only the nominal existence of a right; it also requires that its exercise be effective.

What occurred this week is not an isolated incident. Chile has, on various occasions, resorted to administrative restrictions affecting Bolivian trade. This is the old “customs noose” (dogal aduanero), an expression coined by historian, diplomat, and professor at the Diplomatic Academy Jorge Escobari Cusicanqui to describe the structural dependency Bolivia maintains on Chilean ports and customs controls.

The expression captures how, after losing its coastline, Bolivia became permanently dependent on Pacific ports. It was not necessary to close access to the sea entirely. It was enough to manage schedules, inspections, priorities, or infrastructure in ways that conditioned Bolivian trade. More than a century later, the mechanism appears to have changed form but not logic. Today, the noose is manifested not only through tariffs or customs controls but also through restricted operating hours, border congestion, and administrative decisions that, while not formally denying free transit, end up limiting its effective exercise.

In March 2024, following a negotiation process, authorities from both countries publicly announced the extension of operations at the Colchane–Pisiga border crossing to 24 hours a day. The announcement was made in the presence of the then Chilean Consul, Ambassador Fernando Velasco, and was presented as an example of bilateral cooperation. It was an agreement, even if reached verbally. Or does the word of a state, expressed through its representatives, carry no value in international relations?

This week, barely two years later, Chilean authorities reversed that schedule, citing infrastructure maintenance works. No one disputes a state’s right to carry out works within its territory. What is questionable is when such measures end up restricting the exercise of an international obligation specifically intended to guarantee the flow of trade. If agreements can be altered through unilateral decisions, they cease to be international commitments and become mere declarations subject to convenience.

Those who argue that “Chile has the right to administer its border crossings as it sees fit…” ignore international law. Of course, Chile may administer its borders, provided it does so in compliance with the international obligations it freely accepted.

In the international sphere, sovereignty does not consist merely of doing whatever a state wishes; it consists of exercising its powers while complying with its obligations—again, I emphasize and underline—obligations that were freely consented to.

What is concerning, in some cases, is the lack of understanding of international law. If such individuals occupy diplomatic positions, they lack the necessary qualifications. They are diplomats by appointment, not by training. They would do well to read the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. That instrument establishes the rules governing how states negotiate, interpret, and comply with treaties. For a diplomat, this Convention is what a slide rule is to an architect: an indispensable tool for properly exercising the profession.

Article 27 of that Convention is unequivocal: no state may invoke provisions of its internal law as justification for failing to perform a treaty. In other words, if a state has granted a right, it cannot avoid compliance by citing legal, administrative, budgetary, or organizational reasons, nor even by claiming that compliance would conflict with its own constitution.

If a restriction is truly unavoidable, the proper course is to negotiate with the other party, agree on mitigation mechanisms, and, if necessary, adopt compensatory measures. That is how international law works. It is as simple as that.

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