The Real 50–50 | El verdadero 50-50

By German Huanca, Publico.bo:

Bolivia today debates fiscal decentralization with great enthusiasm: 50% of resources for the central government and the other 50% for the regions. It sounds attractive, but redistributing public spending among more administrators does not touch the underlying problem: the country does not generate new resources, it simply divides what it already has. The real 50–50 that Bolivia needs is not the one in the fiscal pact, although it is a legitimate demand, but that of foreign direct investment, a model of co-participation between the Bolivian state and international private capital that is already embedded in the worldview of the ordinary Bolivian, and which could well become the real way out of the crisis.

Let us be clear: the fiscal pact being discussed is more of the same. Passing the administration of spending to the regions will not solve the structural crisis; what it will do is multiply bureaucracies. It already happened with the municipalities, and it will happen again with the governorships. Something more sensible could be done: simplify competencies, leave the central government in charge of public administration, security, defense, social protection, debt, and national programs, and have the regions take charge of education, health, infrastructure, and economic development. But even so, distributing scarcity better is not the same as generating abundance. Bolivia’s problem is not how it distributes what it has, but that it is not generating anything new.

The conversation that really matters is how to attract foreign direct investment that brings fresh dollars into the economy. History makes it clear: when Bolivia maintained a contractual relationship that favored the oil investor, 82% for the companies and 18% for the state, capital arrived and the sector developed. Evo Morales reversed that equation, investors left, and today we face an energy crisis of proportions that no one wants to openly acknowledge. All because of shifting a percentage. The cost of that decision is what we are paying now and will continue to pay.

Now, what is interesting is that Bolivians already know how the 50–50 works, even if they have never called it that. When a farmer does not have the means to cultivate his land, he looks for a partner: he puts up the land, the other provides the seed, finances the machinery, shares the labor, and what is produced is split in half. The investor does not take more or less. That same principle, applied to international agreements, is exactly what Bolivia should offer: clarity in the rules, equitable treatment, and respect for whoever brings the capital.

The pasanaku and the ayni move in the same direction. In the pasanaku, when the bank does not appear, the group finances itself in turns: whoever receives first has a positive Net Present Value (NPV), whoever receives last has a negative NPV, but everyone achieves the objective. In the ayni the logic is simple: “today for you, tomorrow for me,” and repayment comes in the same measure, sometimes a little more. It is not disinterested generosity; it is a balanced transaction. That same way of understanding exchanges makes the 50–50 with foreign investors not an imported or alien idea, but something any Bolivian understands without much explanation.

And the assets are there, waiting. Uyuni, for example, could perfectly become the world center of high-end tourism: first-class hotels, an airport with a direct highway connection, urban air mobility, hot air balloons as a common part of the landscape, cleanliness and signage of the highest standard. The state does not have to do it; private investment should. Right now there are investors looking at Bolivian lithium and rare earths, ready to put up capital if they see clear distribution rules and environmental standards that work. In the world, states capture between 30% and 60% of profits in this type of contract; poor countries ask for more, developed ones less. By history and idiosyncrasy, a fixed 50% by rule is a reasonable, fair position that any Bolivian can defend.

The crisis will not be solved by better distributing what already exists, but by producing more. The external debt that grows every year is not a solution; it is a patch that deepens the problem. The real 50–50, the one Bolivians practice on their plots, in their neighborhoods, and at their festivities, is the lever the country needs to export more, attract capital, and grow in oil, mining, tourism, and forestry. The fiscal pact can move forward—welcome it—but let no one be confused: the crisis will not come out through that path.

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