Retirement Pay at Risk | Jubilaciones en peligro

By El Pais:

Pension Funds: The Last Snapshot Before Official Silence

Thirteen months, 29.5 billion dollars (as of February 2026), and 2.7 million contributors: the SIP portfolio reveals how the Bolivian State financed its most severe crisis with workers’ pension savings.

In December 2025, President Rodrigo Paz Pereira set off a nationwide alarm. “Your contributions are not in the Gestora; they were spent,” he declared publicly. The phrase was technically incorrect — the funds are not kept in cash but invested in a portfolio of financial instruments — but it pointed to something real: the Bolivian State had used the pension savings of 2.7 million workers as a source of financing during the country’s worst economic crisis in decades.

The former manager of the Public Pension Fund Administrator (Gestora Pública), Jaime Durán, responded that the fund reached Bs 203.704 billion as of November 27, 2025, distributed 50% in fixed-term deposits (DPFs) in private banks, 35% in instruments of the General Treasury of the Nation (TGN), 12% in the private sector, and 3% abroad. The State, he emphasized, had punctually met all capital and interest payments. The Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) criticized Paz for generating unnecessary panic. But the debate was not about whether the funds existed; it was about how they had been invested and in whose favor.

Yet neither Paz Pereira nor the COB questioned the absence of a Board of Directors at the Gestora, which, under the 2010 Pensions Law, should have been formed from shortlists approved by the Chamber of Deputies. The Board is the highest authority within the Gestora and defines policies and operational mechanisms — but it does not exist.

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The complaint about interest rates in May 2024 — which the new government describes as “excessively high” — takes on its full dimension when observing the evolution of sovereign debt in the portfolio during the months preceding the period analyzed. In January 2024, total investment in TGN and Central Bank (BCB) bonds denominated in bolivianos already represented 27.18% of the fund, and sovereign debt as a whole 32.72%. In February it rose to 27.33% and 32.98%, respectively. In March, to 27.57% and 33.18%. In April 2024 — the month immediately preceding the one that generated the official complaint — it reached 27.80% and 33.44%. Steadily and unequivocally, each month the government of Luis Arce Catacora placed more sovereign debt into the pension fund, at one of the moments of greatest fiscal pressure in Bolivia’s recent history. Gross international reserves had fallen below 2 billion dollars in 2024 according to BCB data, with liquid foreign currency plunging from 172 million in January of that year to 46.8 million in December and to just 29.9 million in May 2025. Access to external credit was practically closed.

Paz’s government gained access to these records upon taking office in November 2025, but it has not published new portfolio reports since the date of the last public release, which dates back to June 2025. Thus, opacity is not the exclusive domain of the previous administration; it is, so far, the system’s stance.

Sovereign Debt, the Dominant Weight of the Portfolio

Article 140 of the Pensions Law instructs prioritizing investment of resources in productive enterprises.

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Between May 2024 and June 2025, the fund grew from 26.587 to 28.647 billion dollars, an increase of 2.059 billion (+7.7%), fueled by workers’ monthly contributions and portfolio returns.

SOVEREIGN DEBT
By June 2025, TGN bonds already accounted for 36.68% of the total fund.

By far the largest segment is national sovereign debt. By June 2025, 36.68% of the fund — more than 10.5 billion dollars — was placed in instruments of the Bolivian State: TGN and BCB bonds denominated in bolivianos and Housing Development Units (UFVs). Non-mandatory TGN bonds in bolivianos alone grew from 7.297 billion dollars in May 2024 to 8.525 billion in June 2025; a net addition of 1.228 billion, the largest of any investment category during the period.

The average maturity of these instruments is 10,605 days, nearly 29 years. Several are zero-coupon bonds, meaning the fund disburses today and only collects the face value nearly three decades later. With cumulative inflation exceeding 16% annually through July 2025, the real value of those future collections could be substantially lower than the purchasing power of the money contributed today. The structural beneficiary of this scheme is the State, which dilutes its liabilities by repaying depreciated bolivianos. Those harmed are active workers and retirees.

Private banking and Fassil risk

In the national banking segment, the fund maintains fixed-term deposits in the Bolivian financial system: Banco Nacional de Bolivia, Banco Mercantil Santa Cruz, BancoSol, and other institutions are regular recipients. But the most critical position is exposure to Banco Fassil and its controlling holding company, Sociedad Controladora Santa Cruz Financial Group. Both entities hold a ‘D’ rating — default, the lowest level — and the fund kept between 4.39% and 5.17% of its assets in them throughout the entire period: between 1.15 and 1.4 billion dollars trapped in intervened institutions. The double exposure — bank and holding — amplifies risk. The position was not liquidated, probably because DPFs are fixed-term contracts without early withdrawal and because a massive exit would have precipitated a banking crisis.

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Among companies with foreign capital and domicile operating in Bolivia whose bonds appear in the portfolio, the holdings include Telecel Bolivia (telecommunications), the Railway Companies of the Bolivian train system, COBEE (Bolivian Electric Energy Company), and a group of microfinance institutions with strong local presence: BancoSol, ProCredit, FIE, and CRECER, several linked to international organizations or religious entities. They are stable presences throughout the analyzed period, but they do not bring foreign investment and finance their operations with workers’ savings.

At the opposite extreme, some investments disappeared. The full amortization of BCB Redeemable Bonds in UFVs released approximately 77 million dollars. In September 2024, an investment in shares of the Closed-End Investment Fund (FIC) of Mexico’s Grupo Nacional Provincial (GNP) — that country’s largest insurer, controlled by Grupo BAL of magnate Alberto Baillères — appeared and disappeared within a single month, for an amount of around 25 million dollars, without known public explanation.

Las Lomas: The Productive Exception

The most striking case of the period is Las Lomas Import Export S.A., a Bolivian steel company founded in 1969, with 100% national shareholding and presence in seven departments of the country.

In 2021, it inaugurated Bolivia’s first steel plant — built by the Italian firm Danieli, one of the world’s most experienced — in the municipality of Buena Vista, with installed capacity of 200,000 tons per year of rebar and plain steel. Bolivia had until then been the only country in Latin America without this type of industry. The company substitutes imports, saves foreign currency, generates direct and indirect employment nationwide, and uses domestic scrap metal as raw material.

The company has been present in the portfolio at least since 2018, when it began issuing bonds. At the start of 2024, the fund held a USD 63 million position in its instruments. Between March and July of that year, APS diversification reports recorded the position with a residual value of only USD 104,000, despite the four bond issuances remaining outstanding with balances throughout that period. The discrepancy likely reflects a mark-to-market valuation criterion applied in that stretch, not a real divestment. In August 2024, the position again appeared at USD 58.9 million, rated A1. Since then, it gradually declined to USD 48.5 million by June 2025, reflecting the growth of the total fund more than an active divestment.

Unlike most cases analyzed, this investment approaches the mandate of the Pensions Law: Bolivian capital, national production, import substitution, and generation of added value. Alongside nearly 29-year TGN bonds, Las Lomas instruments have concrete recovery horizons: Issuance 1 matured in February 2026, meaning part of the capital will begin returning to the fund in the short term — a notable contrast with the structure of the rest of the sovereign portfolio.

International Opening: Ten Counterparties, 0.65% of the Fund

Internationally, the portfolio recorded its most significant expansion of the period. Since May 2024, the fund held investments in U.S. Treasury Bonds. In September 2024, a position appeared for the first time in an ETF of BlackRock Inc., the world’s largest asset manager with over 10 trillion dollars under management. The amount was modest — 1,974,801 dollars nominal, 2,125,438 market value in June 2025 — but its presence in a Bolivian state fund, in a country with capital controls and foreign currency scarcity, is symbolically notable.

From November 2024 onward, diversification accelerated: bonds from CAF (Development Bank of Latin America), the World Bank, CABEI, the IDB, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), the Korea Development Bank (KDB), Germany’s KfW, and Korea Eximbank entered. In nine months, the international portfolio moved from one counterparty to ten, and the total amount grew from around 50 million to approximately 250 million dollars. Even so, the entire international block represented only 0.65% of the fund as of June 2025.

Savings as Collateral: Repos, Scarce Dollars, and Sovereign Risk

Three additional elements complete the risk analysis of the period.

The first is repo operations on external sovereign debt. Between November 2024 and January 2025, portfolio statements record the note: “(*) Repo operation” on Bolivian bonds issued in international markets. A repo is a short-term loan secured by a financial asset. The Public Gestora used external Bolivian sovereign bonds — with nominal value of 918.8 million dollars — as collateral to obtain immediate liquidity. Those bonds were already trading at a significant discount: their market value was 653.8 million dollars, reflecting perceptions of Bolivia’s credit risk in international markets. The practice does not appear illegal, but the use of pension assets as collateral to provide liquidity to the State during three consecutive months — at the height of the international reserves crisis — goes beyond ordinary pension fund management and, according to consulted analysts, does not meet the priorities established by the Constitution and the Pensions Law.

The second element is the June 2025 dollar-denominated issuance. For the first time in the analyzed period, the TGN placed in the fund a bond denominated in U.S. dollars: nominal value of 25 million, maturity of 529 days (approximately 17 months). The position is small in relative terms — 0.09% of the fund — but its meaning is not. The Arce government, in its final months before leaving office in November 2025, was turning to the pension fund to obtain the country’s scarcest currency.

Credit Rating and Concentration Risk

The third element, which should be attributed to the lack of financing for national productive companies, is the deterioration of sovereign risk. Financing foreign extractive-sector companies without demanding added value and technology transfer over the last 30 years affects the real economy.

Bolivia recorded during the period a cascade of credit downgrades by the three main international agencies. S&P moved from CCC+ to CCC- between October 2024 and June 2025. Fitch dropped from CCC to CCC- in January 2025. Moody’s was the most drastic: from Caa1 at the beginning of the period to Ca in April 2025, just one notch above selective default.

All three series tell the same story: during the 18 months analyzed, Bolivian sovereign risk did not deteriorate marginally; it entered fully into imminent default territory by international standards. This is directly reflected in the discounted price of its external bonds — the same ones the Gestora used as collateral in repo operations. For a fund that concentrates 36.68% of its assets in debt of the same State, the rating trajectory is not a peripheral indicator: it is the system’s central risk.

The overall picture is that of a portfolio with high concentration, limited liquidity, and compromised real returns. Between 70% and 75% of the portfolio, in the inflationary context of 2024–2025, generated negative real returns. Estimates by the organization Flora Tristán Bolivia indicate that bank DPFs offered rates of 2% to 3% annually while inflation exceeded them. Nearly 29-year TGN bonds, denominated in bolivianos without exchange-rate adjustment, fully transfer monetary risk to contributors.

Paz’s new government appointed Marcelo Vladimir Fernández Quiroga to head the Gestora with the explicit mandate that pension funds can no longer be the State’s petty cash. The statement is clear in its intention. But the inherited portfolio contains long-term commitments that no political declaration can dissolve: 8.5 billion dollars in TGN debt with maturities of up to 29 years, 1.25 billion in assets in default, and only embryonic diversification into securities originated by national productive companies — of which Las Lomas is practically the only significant example during the period.

The announced audit should reveal the exact rates at which the bonds denounced in May 2024 were issued — data absent from the public reports analyzed and at the core of the controversy. Until that information is made public, the 2.7 million workers whose future depends on the SIP lack the necessary elements to assess what awaits them, while their own sources of employment, without national financing, weaken or languish.

This is, to date, the last available snapshot of Bolivia’s pension funds. Since June 2025, the portfolio has not been made public again.

Six Findings That Define the State of the SIP

Growing concentration in TGN. Non-mandatory TGN bonds in bolivianos grew from 25.51% to 27.96% of the fund between May 2024 and June 2025, adding 1.228 billion dollars in new investments in sovereign debt. The growth occurred at the worst moment of Bolivia’s economic crisis, with reserves at historic lows and the State without access to external credit.

Banco Fassil in default. Throughout the entire period, the fund maintained between 4.39% and 5.17% of its assets — between 1.15 and 1.4 billion dollars — in instruments rated ‘D,’ specifically Banco Fassil and its controlling company Santa Cruz Financial Group. The double exposure to bank and holding amplifies risk. The position was gradually reduced but not liquidated.

Repo operations. The Gestora used external sovereign bonds with nominal value of 918.8 million dollars as collateral in repo operations for at least three consecutive months (November 2024 to January 2025), at the critical moment of the foreign currency crisis. The market value of those bonds was only 653.8 million.

Failure to prioritize productive enterprises. The Gestora and the Securities Market did not comply with the Pensions Law mandate to prioritize financing of the productive sector with value preservation. Investment in Las Lomas — a Bolivian steelmaker with real production and import substitution — is the exception that proves the rule: it represented less than 0.2% of the fund at its highest point.

Las Lomas, productive exception. Present in the portfolio since 2018, with USD 63 million at the start of 2024, Bolivia’s first steelmaker — 100% national capital, 200,000 tons/year of rebar and plain steel — is the only case in the period where pension investment finances real national production. Its A1 rating and concrete maturities structurally distinguish it from the bulk of the sovereign portfolio, whose maturities extend up to nearly three decades.

International opening. Between September and November 2024, the portfolio incorporated BlackRock ETF, the U.S. Treasury (reclassified), CAF, World Bank, CABEI, IDB, JBIC, KDB, KfW, and Korea Eximbank. In nine months it moved from one international counterparty to ten. Even so, they represented 0.65% of the fund as of June 2025.

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