The Convenient MAS Legacy | La conveniente herencia masista

Editorial, El Dia:

A phrase often attributed to Franklin D. Roosevelt—probably one he never actually said—referred to the Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza: “Yes, he’s a son of a bitch, but he’s our son of a bitch.” The phrase endured not because of its authenticity, but because of the moral truth it conveys: power often tolerates what it once condemned, so long as it now belongs to it. That is the danger looming over Bolivia today.

The government of Rodrigo Paz Pereira came to power promising to dismantle the hypertrophied apparatus inherited from the MAS. It pledged to debureaucratize the State, restore institutional order, and break with the centralism that turned the country into a rigid, inefficient system deeply vulnerable to corruption. Yet after one hundred days in office, what is perceived is not dismantling, but adaptation. Not transformation, but comfort.

The problem is not individuals, but structures. Governments are not defined by their speeches, but by the institutions they preserve. And Bolivia’s institutions remain intact. The same apparatus that enabled political control over the judiciary, the concentration of economic power, and the subordination of oversight bodies continues operating without substantial alteration.

Handpicked appointments in key entities such as the Comptroller General’s Office or the Central Bank of Bolivia are not merely administrative decisions; they signal that power continues to operate under the same discretionary logic. Institutional rebuilding is not achieved through good intentions, but through clear rules, transparent processes, and real limits on political power.

The State remains the same giant. Its size and influence have not been reduced. State-owned companies continue to function as centers of political power and sources of clientelism. Centralism remains untouched. The bureaucratic apparatus has not been dismantled; it has been inherited.

And where structures are not eliminated, structures ultimately shape the ruler.

A clear example is the expansion of the Ministry of the Presidency, which has absorbed functions and powers previously dispersed elsewhere. Instead of reducing concentrated authority, it has been reorganized. The bureaucratic monster has not been eliminated; it has merely been relocated. The result is the same: greater concentration, greater dependency, and greater distance between power and the citizen.

The temptation is understandable. That apparatus was designed precisely to concentrate power. It is efficient in one thing: perpetuating itself. It offers control, appointment power, influence over resources, and room to reward loyalties. It is a perfect instrument for governing without checks and balances—and for destroying institutional order.

Most troubling is the silence. Judicial reform is no longer discussed. Redesigning the State is no longer discussed. Dismantling the model that enabled the concentration of power is no longer discussed. Reformist urgency appears to have been replaced by administrative convenience.

History shows that no government is immune to the power of the structures it inherits. When a system is designed to concentrate power, it does not matter who administers it: the outcome tends to be the same. Institutions do not change through willpower; they change through reform. And without reform, everything remains the same.

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