By ANF, Eju.tv:

The Money Behind Gold: Capitalists, Trading Companies, and Alleged Illicit Funds

Gold mining in Bolivia is sustained not only by the work and contributions of cooperative miners. Behind the operations lies a network of domestic and foreign private capital, trading companies and, according to specialists, resources whose origin may be linked to illicit activities.

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Illustrative image: GN

Alfredo Zaconeta, a researcher at the Center for Labor and Agrarian Development Studies (CEDLA), stated that the financing of illegal mining has developed in a context marked by the State’s limitations in addressing the sector’s economic needs. Mining analyst and former president of the Bolivian Mining Corporation (COMIBOL), Héctor Córdova, agreed that resources come from various sources and that the financing structure is not homogeneous.

For Zaconeta, one of the roots of the problem lies in the lack of sufficient state financing. Although the Mining Financing Fund (FOFIM) exists, he believes that this mechanism has failed to meet the demand of mining cooperatives.

“Cooperative miners are afraid of FOFIM,” Zaconeta told ANF, referring to administrative bureaucracy and the measures used to recover loans. According to the researcher, at one point nearly 80% of the fund’s portfolio corresponded to gold-mining cooperatives, many of them in default and some facing legal proceedings for the auction of their assets.

Faced with difficulties in accessing public resources, cooperatives turn to contributions from their members or to private investors. However, Zaconeta warned that this second approach may violate mining legislation. “The cooperative miner’s capacity to contribute is limited,” he explained, which leads organizations to seek outside investment, even though Article 151 of the Mining Law prohibits partnerships between cooperatives and private capital.

Foreign investors appear throughout this circuit. Zaconeta identified capital originating from China, Colombia, Chile, and Peru, operating under different models but sharing a common objective: quickly recovering their investment through gold extraction.

According to the researcher, some Chinese investors even make their participation conditional on cooperatives not having their documents and permits fully regularized. In other cases, Colombian investors divide mining areas and seek individual contributors, while Chilean and Peruvian capital can reach amounts of up to $10 million and finance highly mechanized operations.

To conceal these associations, Zaconeta said that service contracts are often used under the guise of “technical advisory services.” However, he argued that behind these documents lies a different economic relationship: “the private investor actually keeps between 70% and 80% of the profits from the mining operation.”

Gold trading companies constitute another financial link in the chain. According to Zaconeta, major exporting firms attract capital abroad, mainly from destinations such as the United Arab Emirates and India, and channel it through local trading companies and gold buyers.

These purchasers travel directly to mining communities and buy gold in cash at the so-called “mine mouth.” The mechanism is attractive to producers because it avoids paperwork, transportation costs, and risks associated with moving the metal.

Córdova explained that trading companies can also become financiers themselves. “When a trading company identifies a highly promising gold deposit, it decides to finance the miners directly by providing them with capital in advance,” he told ANF.

He also identified the presence of Bolivian capitalists capable of investing $1 million or more in machinery and mining operations. Within this group, he mentioned allegations involving former government officials, legislators, and cooperative members who have accumulated significant wealth.

A less visible actor in this structure is the so-called “capitalists’ managers.” According to Córdova, these intermediaries seek out peasant organizations that are just beginning their mining permit procedures and offer to facilitate paperwork while securing machinery and investors.

The result may be the establishment of informal contracts that commit as much as 70% or 80% of production to the capitalist and require the remainder to be sold to a designated trading company.

The connection with illicit activities constitutes the most sensitive part of the circuit. Zaconeta warned of indications that resources originating from criminal activities may be entering the gold-mining sector. Among other factors, he mentioned the influx of capital generated by coca surpluses in the Chapare region and the existence of an illegal mercury trafficking route.

Córdova, while taking a more cautious position, stated that in Bolivia it is extremely difficult to determine the origin of all these funds. Nevertheless, he believes there is a “strong suspicion” that illegal mining may be receiving illicit money. His argument is based, among other factors, on investigations conducted in neighboring countries where gold has been used as a mechanism for laundering funds from criminal organizations.

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