The dream of the central corridor: When did Bolivia miss the train of history? (Part II) | El sueño del corredor central: ¿Cuándo Bolivia perdió el tren de la historia? (Parte II)

By Windsor Hernani, Vision 360:

To achieve this, the country needs state-level decisions: competitive logistics infrastructure and a foreign policy capable of effectively coordinating with Brazil, Peru, and China.

In January 2026, Chile’s Customs Chamber announced in a press release that a shipment of Bolivian beef crossed the border into Chile. It was not going to be sold in Arica. The cargo entered Chilean territory as international customs transit, was loaded at the port of Arica, transported by sea to the Peruvian port of Chancay, and from there sailed to Shanghai.

This seemingly minor event constitutes a clear snapshot of the new South American geoeconomics and geopolitics. It marks the beginning of a new regional logistics order that Bolivia must take into account when defining its domestic infrastructure policy and its foreign policy. Chancay will be the future logistics hub of the South Pacific. In fact, I would say: it will not be in the future—it already is today!

The mega-port of Chancay, inaugurated in November 2024 and located 75 km north of Lima, handled 286,255 TEU in its first year, exceeding projections. The crucial and revealing fact is that 45% of that cargo came from neighboring countries under the transshipment modality: Chile, Ecuador, Colombia, and—though in a minimal proportion—Bolivia as well.

From a geostrategic perspective, we must understand that the so-called “meat route” was not an isolated experiment; it was a pilot test of what South American logistics will look like in the coming decades. Most regional cargo destined for China—including Bolivia’s—will pass through Chancay. In this scheme, northern Chilean ports such as Arica and Iquique will become feeders for the new South Pacific hub.

There is no doubt: Chancay’s entry into operation irreversibly alters the rules of the game. The reasons are compelling: it has greater operational capacity and is closer to Shanghai, reducing maritime travel time. This reduction generates savings for shipping companies, which in turn translate into lower costs and freight rates.

Under this new scenario, it is reasonable to conclude that no exporter will prefer northern Chilean ports as ports of origin when direct access to Chancay is available. Obviously, Chilean ports will not disappear, but their role will change: they will become collection points for regional cargo to be sent to Chancay and then transshipped to Asia. Chancay will be, simultaneously, their executioner and their lifeline.

But Chancay has even greater ambitions. With an additional projected investment of $3.5 billion through 2032, its expansion plan aims to turn it into the largest, most automated, and smartest port in South America.

To achieve that goal, it needs to incorporate the cargo of the South American giant. Brazil, the world’s seventh-largest economy and one of the largest exporters to Asia, requires an efficient outlet to the Pacific. From this convergence emerges the Bi-Oceanic Railway Corridor project, which would connect Brazil’s central-west region directly to Chancay. Thus, in 2025, Brazil, China, and Peru promoted agreements and preliminary studies outlining a route that would cross the Brazilian and Peruvian Amazon to reach the port of Chancay.

Unfortunately, once again—as happened with the Capricorn Corridor—Bolivia has been left out of the regional design, despite its privileged geographic location. We are the architects of our own missteps, the result of incompetent authorities who fail to understand the geopolitical dimension of the moment.

In Bolivia’s case, Arica is the main gateway for its foreign trade. This logistical dependence, which Chile has repeatedly instrumentalized despite its commitment to free transit, largely explains the structural asymmetry in the bilateral relationship.

Understanding this dynamic is essential to anticipate the future of Bolivia–Chile relations. Chilean ports will lose influence in maritime transport. It is inevitable: goods bound for Asia will depart from Chancay.

For Bolivia, whose share of exports and imports to and from Asia is steadily increasing, the dilemma is clear: continue with the Arica–Chancay–Shanghai route, or strategically embrace the direct Chancay–Shanghai route?

President Rodrigo Paz stated that Bolivia is beginning a new national vision that transcends the past and projects the future. Very well then—the path forward is to realistically accept that Bolivia’s strategic destiny lies in integrating into the Brazil–Chancay interoceanic corridor.

This means abandoning the illusion of corridors that will no longer pass through our territory—we missed that opportunity—and instead betting on intelligent integration into the geoeconomy of the South Pacific.

To achieve this, the country needs state-level decisions: competitive logistics infrastructure and a foreign policy capable of effectively coordinating with Brazil, Peru, and China. The window of opportunity is brief; if no action is taken now, Bolivia will once again miss the train of history, remain on the margins of the major trade flows of the 21st century, and lose the chance to break free from its dependence on Chilean ports.

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