THREE UNCOMFORTABLE LESSONS FROM PERU FOR BOLIVIA | TRES LECCIONES INCÓMODAS DE PERÚ A BOLIVIA

By Oscar Antezana:

Peru changed its president once again last Wednesday the 18th. With the new head of state, there have now been eight in just ten years. Hours after his inauguration, President Paz delivered a message to the Nation marking his first 100 days in office. The question lingered in the air: why at that hour, almost against the current of public attention? Because the content was predictable, laden with rhetoric and promises set in the future tense? Because it confirmed, once again, the absence of a coherent and articulated government plan?

I have lived in Peru for nearly two decades. I have observed its advances, setbacks, and permanent political crises. I inevitably compare its experience with Bolivia’s. There are historical and structural similarities, but also decisive differences. Amid Peru’s instability, at least three immediate lessons emerge that Bolivia would do well to analyze with composure and strategic sense.

The first lesson is institutional and economic: the independence of the Central Reserve Bank of Peru (BCRP). Its president took office in 2006, during Alan García’s second administration, and since then has conducted monetary and exchange-rate policy with technical solvency. For more than two decades, the BCRP has remained autonomous from the Executive, as established by the Constitution. The most illustrative episode occurred during Pedro Castillo’s government. When he attempted to remove the president of the BCRP, the markets reacted immediately: the exchange rate jumped from 3.5 soles per dollar to more than 4.1 within hours. The message was unequivocal. Castillo backed down the next day and the currency stabilized around 3.6 soles. It was a forceful demonstration that institutional credibility is not an abstract concept: it translates into exchange-rate stability, inflation control, and citizen confidence. The data are eloquent. In 2025, inflation in Peru was 1.4%, compared with more than 20% in Bolivia. International reserves exceeded US$90 billion, close to 30% of GDP; in Bolivia they hover around US$3.7 billion, barely 6% of GDP. Peru’s fiscal deficit stood at 2.2% of GDP, while Bolivia’s approaches 13%. And the Peruvian economy grew 3.4%, compared with a negative estimate close to 2% in Bolivia. The lesson is clear: when the Central Bank is perceived as independent and professional, the economy is largely shielded from political swings, from the monetary financing of deficits, and from the bleeding of international reserves.

The second lesson is institutional and legal. Peru carries serious shortcomings in its justice system, like much of Latin America. However, despite corruption and political pressures, justice still functions at critical moments. Freedom of expression and the constant scrutiny of the press have played a key role in keeping citizen oversight active. The case of Pedro Castillo is once again illustrative. After his attempted coup in December 2022, as he headed toward the Mexican Embassy seeking asylum, the Attorney General ordered his immediate detention. The Army and the Police upheld the Constitution. It is not something that happens every day, but it was a forceful institutional message: the forces of the State owe their allegiance to the Constitution, not to the president of the day. Moreover, in the last three decades, six Peruvian former presidents have faced judicial proceedings and prison. In the coming months, the justice system will face a new test: the current president, politically linked to Castillo’s party, has expressed his intention to pardon him. The political outcome remains to be seen, but in the economic sphere the market continues its normal course and the exchange rate has not moved. There is also political awareness that next July there will be a new president elected by popular vote.

The third lesson is cultural and economic. Beyond political turbulence, Peruvian society has internalized the importance of growth, stability, and economic openness. That learning did not fall from the sky; it is the result of decades of reforms, crises overcome, and accumulated consensus. It has permeated the country’s productive culture. Private investment in 2025 reached US$50 billion, of which 80% corresponds to domestic capital. In Bolivia, the figures are opaque; external estimates suggest barely US$150 million in foreign investment and US$200 million in domestic investment. Peruvian exports exceeded US$90 billion, almost ten times more than Bolivia’s. Peru has surpassed Argentina and stands behind Brazil and Mexico, very close to Chile. Peruvian national pride rests on concrete results: its world-renowned cuisine, its global leadership in blueberry and avocado exports, its gold and silver production among the world’s top. There is a tacit alliance — not without tensions — between workers and entrepreneurs to defend private enterprise and employment. The State, with ups and downs, has maintained relatively stable economic policies across different administrations.

Faced with this panorama, inevitable questions arise for Bolivia. Why has the Bolivian government not restored full independence to the Central Bank, or clearly and credibly announced that it will not resort to monetary financing of the deficit? Why have the Executive and Legislative branches not even initiated serious and visible reforms of the judicial system? Why have the dozens of loss-making state-owned companies that drain public resources not been closed? Why has a massive campaign not been launched to recover our liberal values trampled for 20 years by the MAS?

None of these actions requires extraordinary resources or complex international negotiations. There is no need to reinvent the wheel: it is enough to adapt successful reforms from neighboring countries. The key differences are institutional. What is needed is strategic vision and political courage.

Leave a comment