Rebuilding Institutions | Reconstruir las instituciones

By Carlos Toranzo, Brujula Digital:

In 1879, we lost the War of the Pacific because Bolivia had a weak state that lacked presence across its territory, with feeble institutions; in contrast, Chile had developed a solid state with institutions stronger than Bolivia’s. Scholars of Bolivian reality assert that Bolivia has never had a state with developed and credible institutions; almost unanimously, they propose the hypothesis that historically Bolivia has had more civil society than state, which is why the strongest institution is politics in the streets.

It was believed that having a strong civil society was a merit, but in reality it is quite the opposite, since that strength has contributed to the collapse of national institutions. In line with neo-institutionalism, we understand institutions as habits or customs to follow; they may be framed in laws or exist solely as social behaviors and customs. For this very reason, we say that street politics is the country’s leading institution—it has more force and intensity than the Judicial or Legislative branches.

The masses in the streets have learned to present their demands, to press them against the state, and to extract their entitlements; it is in the streets that governments have been overthrown. We are talking about a corporatist-type society, marked by enormous authoritarianism, whose main goal is the pursuit of particular interests rather than a common objective for all Bolivians.

In Bolivia, citizenship is weak, its construction is still in the initial stages, and the task of building the citizen is incomplete; this is why it is natural for the masses, by protesting, marching in the streets, and blockading, to obtain their corporatist claims.

The protesting masses are aware of their rights and almost never of their obligations. The masses, in their mobilizations, may have had democratic content when marching against military dictatorships, but the behavior of the masses has not always been progressive; many times they have mobilized following conservative codes.

The masses that accompanied the hanging of Villarroel were closer to the conservative codes of the oligarchies than to advanced ideas of democracy. The same happens with the masses co-opted by the MAS, who move according to conservative, archaic, and authoritarian codes that have nothing to do with the pursuit of citizen democracy.

The Revolution of 1952 did not lead to the construction of a party system, nor did it build the necessary checks and balances for any democracy. Although there were elections in 1956 and 1960, these were more a form of scrutiny than genuine electoral acts. Even though they were already won by the MNR, paradoxically, it openly committed electoral fraud, because there was no democratic institutional framework, and the electoral authority did not exist as an independent institution.

Even during the first phase of the “pacted” democracy, the electoral institution was weak and entirely dependent on the Executive; for this reason, it was necessary to leave behind the “band of four” and form a National Electoral Court composed of distinguished members. They gave autonomy to the electoral authority and began the independent construction of that institution. However, during the process of change, the institutional strength of the Electoral Power eroded, such that under Morales’ and Arce’s MAS, for several years it functioned as an appendage of the Executive. In the 2025 elections, due to public demand, it had to demonstrate independence.

The Parliament and the Judiciary have continued to obediently follow the Executive’s decisions, meaning they have not become strong institutions capable of maintaining independence and fulfilling their duties in favor of the citizenry. Formally, the Judiciary was chosen by popular vote, but in reality it was the Parliament—dominated by the MAS majority—that did so, ignoring meritocracy and simply following the government party’s line obediently.

This implies that this power is deinstitutionalized, even more so if we know that its rulings are made “to order,” according to the Executive’s convenience. Years ago, members of the Constitutional Court accepted Morales’ unconstitutional re-nomination; in doing so, they demonstrated that the Judiciary was deinstitutionalized.

At present, by punishing Morales and preventing his candidacy, what they demonstrated was that their decisions emanate not from themselves, but from the Executive; this is the shame of a Judiciary that during MAS governments has been and continues to be servile to the government. It now operates through departmental constitutional chambers to carry out whatever the Arce government desires.

When the caudillo’s power is absolute, as in the case of Morales or Arce, his obedient followers—the Judiciary—understand that the caudillo’s word is divine, and so they interpret his needs to keep him in power. When this situation occurs, it means that the state has become deinstitutionalized; therefore, the only institution that exists is the whim of the head of government.

In electoral debates, candidates and citizens focus on economic urgencies, gasoline, diesel, dollars, food inflation, but another urgency is to rebuild institutional strength in Bolivia.

Carlos Toranzo is an economist.

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