What was expected: made easy | Lo que se esperaba: en facilito

By Oscar Antezana Malpartida, El Dia:

The problem is not only economic, it is also political—and that is the hardest to tackle.

Arce and MAS have brought Bolivia to ruin. But they say every crisis brings opportunities. That’s right. Let’s take a look.

First, the reality is that our currency has already been devalued; the new government won’t need to do it, only to make it official. The Bolivian people will not resist because it is already a reality and they know it’s one of the reasons why there is a fuel shortage. Second, if the population no longer wants to stand in long lines, the fuel subsidy should be lifted either all at once or gradually on a scale (this must be studied in more detail because it depends on other economic factors and effects). What months or years ago was unthinkable, no longer is. Inflation will rise in the short term anyway, but there are no options.

The following paragraphs assume the current opposition takes power. If we assume MAS will return, then Venezuelan policies must be analyzed, period.

That said, to control expectations and speculation and stabilize the new exchange rate, the new government will have to act immediately on three interdependent fronts: drastically reduce public spending and thereby the deficit, stop printing inorganic money, and secure balance of payments support from the IMF to supply foreign currency to the economy. Likewise, a plan must be launched to repay the external public debt and negotiate debt relief with the World Bank, the IDB, and CAF, mainly. All of that will be the “easy” part. But that’s not all. People’s expectations can either facilitate or hinder the success of an economic policy—for example, resisting price drops or further devaluation. Two other immediate actions will be needed: to conduct a diagnosis of the country’s situation, make it known to the population, and run an awareness campaign to recover moral and ethical values and stop normalizing corruption and patronage, lies, cynicism, etc.

These measures will lead to more moderate, if not negative, economic growth. Unemployment and poverty will rise. The congressional opposition and its allies will move to block and protest. That is why this information campaign must begin from day one. And, to be more effective, the first structural challenge will be to reform the judicial system because the absence of the rule of law promotes disorder and protects corruption. All institutions must be reviewed from the ground up and the vast majority of authorities replaced. It may be necessary to revise the Political Constitution of the State and/or consider creative solutions, because this issue must be tackled immediately. For that, support in Congress will be essential, either as a legal requirement or to legitimize the measures to maintain political and social stability. And guess what? The opposition must win the elections overwhelmingly in order to have a majority in the Assembly. The issue becomes political.

Moreover, without a reformed or at least partially cleaned-up judicial system, it would be difficult to prosecute and/or imprison those involved in drug trafficking. Another structural challenge is that the government must have the support of the police and armed forces. The top brass of both institutions must be replaced, and key changes must be made within them. And once again, political support from the Assembly will be needed to legitimize the measures and contain possible social unrest. And guess what? The opposition must win the elections clearly and overwhelmingly.

Then come other structural issues, perhaps less urgent—relatively speaking—but just as important: reforms to the national customs and tax systems, and elimination of several ministries as well as public companies. All public companies created by the MAS government must be shut down; they are deficit-ridden and serve as employment agencies for MAS loyalists. Companies such as ENTEL, ENDE, COMIBOL, BOA, and the urea and ammonia plant in Bulo Bulo should be privatized, among others. The case of YPFB is less clear. At the very least, it requires deep changes, replacing its directors and senior managers with competent professionals, reviewing contracts, and developing a short- and medium-term emergency plan to increase production and attract foreign investment.

Private, both national and foreign, investment must be attracted as soon as possible. To that end, certain laws will have to be reviewed and changed—and guess what—it will require a majority in the Assembly. Which sectors should be prioritized to promote investment? Tourism is key—it generates jobs and foreign currency, has a strong multiplier effect, and often reaches rural, marginalized areas. In the process, the State must invest or promote investment in the necessary infrastructure (roads, basic sanitation, electricity, water, etc.) to ensure success. This will generate a lot of employment and integrate the country. Reviving agroindustry is also necessary because it’s “low-hanging fruit” that can drive growth and job creation. Mining, including illegal mining, is also key—but this sector needs reform. What should we do about lithium industrialization? A serious and professional study must be conducted that considers existing and future investments, the most suitable technology, global demand for lithium, environmental impact, among other factors. On that note, feasibility studies must be prepared for the exploitation of rare earth minerals. And guess what. A majority in the Assembly is needed.

This article is by no means exhaustive. But note, dear reader, that the economic aspects can be tackled—we have the knowledge and experience at hand. The problem is political; it is a cultural battle. It’s not just about applying economic policies in a dogmatic, radical way, which, while desirable, may not be the best path. These policies must be closely coordinated with political and social aspects that are part of the reality of any country, not just Bolivia, and which are key to changing the country. That’s not a lukewarm stance—it’s understanding the social, political, and institutional context of a country.

The goal is to lay solid foundations, which will take at least ten years (two presidential terms), for the country’s sustainable development. The idea is not for socialism to return in five more years.

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