The Misdirection of the Traditional Opposition | El extravío de la oposición tradicional

By Rolando Telleria, Los Tiempos:

Since the acute crisis of representation and credibility that occurred at the end of the cycle of the pact-based democracy in October 2003, the traditional political opposition to the Movement for Socialism (MAS) has never been able to compete honorably at the polls since 2005. There have been five elections of overwhelming continuous defeats.

To better understand this poor performance, let’s look at the results of these last elections.

In the December 2005 elections, the emerging opposition still faced the MAS candidate, divided into four forces: Podemos; the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR); National Unity (UN); and the New Republican Force (NFR). Together, these four political forces garnered 43.6 percent. The MAS, with Evo Morales, in a historic vote, swept nearly 54 percent of the vote. Morales managed to consolidate in his favor the accumulated social discontent. Therefore, it is not far-fetched to say that it was the abominable spawn of party politics. Its corrupt and patronage-driven actions “sponsored” the path to power.

In the December 2009 elections, debuting the Constitution of the Plurinational State, with new rules of the game, the traditional opposition faced Evo Morales and the MAS, just like in 2005, divided into four political forces: Plan Progress for Bolivia – National Convergence (PPB-CN); National Unity (UN); Social Alliance (AS); and the Movement of Patriotic Social Unity (Muspa). Together, they barely reached 36.09 percent. In contrast, the MAS achieved its highest historic vote, approaching 64 percent. If one observes closely, here begins that unprecedented concentration of power in the hands of one person and one party. That brutal concentration of power, where the opposition forces have a great share of responsibility, will be reflected in the majority composition, with more than two-thirds, in the Plurinational Legislative Assembly (ALP).

In the elections of October 12, 2014, again divided, the traditional opposition participated with three political forces, namely: Christian Democratic Party (PDC), led by Jorge Quiroga; Democratic Unity (UD), by Samuel Doria Medina, and the Movement without Fear (MSM), by Juan del Granado. Together, the three forces barely achieved 35.98 percent. The MAS binomial, on the other hand, achieved 61.36 percent. Once again, incapable of assimilating the lessons from their mistakes and their acute shortsightedness, the functional opposition contributed again to that harmful concentration of power.

Now, for the failed elections of 2019, after the historic result of the popular consultation on February 21, 2016, where the re-re-re-election of the leader was rejected – with clear symptoms of Hubris syndrome, the disease of power – again lost, the traditional opposition faced those elections divided into five forces: Civic Community (CC), the political alliance Bolivia says NO, the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), Civic Unity Solidarity (UCS), and the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR). On this occasion, by not forming a single bloc, they missed the historic opportunity to aspire, at least, to a second round.

As everyone knows, faced with the imminent fraud, confirmed by the Organization of American States (OAS), in an audit requested by Morales himself, citizen mobilization in the streets cornered the leader, forcing him to resign on November 10 after 21 days of mobilization. The transitional government that emerged, made up of political representatives of the traditional opposition, failed resoundingly, paving the way once again, in the October 2020 elections, for the return of the MAS to power.

In these last elections, the traditional opposition participated with five forces: We Believe, led by Luis Fernando Camacho; Civic Community (CC); Front for Victory (FPV); Together, led by Jeanine Áñez, and the Bolivian National Action Party (Panbol). Together, they achieved 44.7 percent, while Arce Catacora of the MAS reached 55 percent, achieving the unimaginable comeback.

These are five elections in which they never constituted a true and competitive opposition. It begs the question, then: where does this resounding failure lie?

The answers can be varied. From the absence of true leadership to the lack of a serious alternative political project, in addition to the inexplicable division.

However, it is clear that they have no idea that, to defeat the MAS, they must beat it in the countryside. They will never be able to defeat the MAS only with urban votes. Their projects and proposals must transcend the electorate of the middle classes. Meanwhile, even divided, the MAS has all the possibilities of winning.

It would be of vital importance, then, for the political forces and traditional opposition leaders to buy a compass to get out of their eternal labyrinth.

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