By Fernando Romero, Eju.tv:

The Good, the Bad, and the Dangerous of the IMF Agreement and How to Prevent the Population from Paying the Bill

1. Executive Summary of the IMF Memorandum

The economic program proposes a comprehensive stabilization of the Bolivian economy through fiscal adjustment, monetary control, and a more flexible exchange-rate regime. The objective is to gradually reduce the deficit, limit Central Bank financing to the public sector, rebuild international reserves, and restore debt sustainability. The program establishes a Non-Financial Public Sector (NFPS) deficit of up to Bs. 46.8 billion in 2026 and a monetary base target of Bs. 133.9 billion by year-end.

The adjustment also includes the elimination of subsidies, rationalization of public spending, increased revenue mobilization, and structural reforms. At the same time, it seeks to protect vulnerable sectors through a social spending floor of Bs. 9.3 billion accumulated by December 2026 and improved targeting of transfers. Inflation is projected at 14% by the end of 2026, with a subsequent decline toward single-digit levels.

In the financial sector, the program aims to strengthen banking stability through stress tests, asset-quality assessments, enhanced supervision, and bank-resolution mechanisms. The exchange-rate regime will be flexible and market-oriented, while the Central Bank of Bolivia (BCB) will be required to maintain zero net new credit to the public sector. Overall, the program seeks to correct deep imbalances and restore confidence, although it implies significant short-term costs in terms of inflation, growth, credit availability, and purchasing power.

2. Main Recommendations and Targets in the Monetary and Fiscal Areas

1. Fiscal Consolidation and Elimination of the Primary Deficit

This is the central condition of the program. Bolivia must implement a fiscal adjustment of approximately 8.5% of GDP between 2026 and 2029, eliminate the primary deficit by the end of the program, and reduce the overall deficit to 3.5% of GDP by 2029. For 2026, the deficit should not exceed Bs. 47 billion, or 9.3% of GDP. This implies controlling current expenditures, payroll costs, public investment, and subsidies.

2. Prohibition of Deficit Financing Through the Central Bank

The program establishes a ceiling of zero for new net BCB credit to the NFPS. This is probably one of the most significant financial changes: the fiscal deficit will have to be financed without resorting to money creation by the Central Bank. The goal is to prevent the deficit from once again translating into inflation, exchange-rate pressure, and reserve losses.

3. Public Debt Sustainability

The program seeks to place public debt on a downward path and reduce it to below 90% of GDP by 2029. This will be achieved through fiscal consolidation, economic growth, and lower real borrowing costs. It also aims to develop the domestic debt market and maintain access to multilateral financing.

4. Elimination of Fuel Subsidies

The program envisages that by 2027 there will be no fuel subsidies financed by the Treasury or state-owned enterprises, and that prices will reach cost-recovery levels beginning in January of that year. This is fiscally important because it reduces a significant source of budgetary pressure, but it also represents one of the greatest inflationary and social risks.

5. Flexible, Market-Determined Exchange Rate Regime

Bolivia must maintain a flexible exchange-rate regime, allow banks to freely trade foreign currency, and limit Central Bank intervention. The objective is to correct exchange-rate distortions and restore competitiveness, although depreciation may temporarily increase inflation and the local-currency value of external debt.

6. Strengthening International Reserves

The program establishes a minimum target for increasing Net International Reserves (NIR), as well as targets for gross international reserves. Reserve accumulation will depend on disbursements from international organizations, external adjustment, and a gradual recovery in foreign-exchange purchases.

7. Control of the Monetary Base and Inflation

The monetary base becomes the principal operational instrument of the new monetary framework. For 2026, the monetary base ceiling is Bs. 133.9 billion by December, while the program projects inflation of 14% at the end of 2026 and a return to single-digit inflation by 2028.

8. Targeted Social Protection

The program requires a minimum level of social-assistance spending and proposes creating a unified social registry with means-testing mechanisms. The purpose is to ensure that resources reach those who genuinely need protection during the adjustment process.

9. Financial System Reform

Stress tests, asset-quality assessments, strengthened capital and liquidity requirements, and reforms to the bank-resolution framework will be implemented. The program also proposes moving toward the elimination of lending-rate caps and directed-credit quotas.

10. Structural Reforms to Encourage Private Investment

The program seeks to gradually eliminate price controls and export restrictions, review hydrocarbon and mining regulations, improve legal certainty, restructure state-owned enterprises, and strengthen governance. The goal is to progressively replace growth driven by public spending with growth based on private investment, productivity, and formal employment.

3. Three Positive and Three Negative Aspects of the IMF Memorandum

Positive Aspect 1: Restoration of Fiscal Discipline

The program directly addresses one of Bolivia’s main structural problems: the persistent fiscal deficit and its financing through the Central Bank. The objective of eliminating the primary deficit and reducing the overall deficit to 3.5% of GDP by 2029 could improve the State’s solvency, reduce borrowing needs, and restore credibility among creditors and investors. From a financial perspective, it is positive to progressively separate fiscal policy from monetary issuance.

Positive Aspect 2: Greater Exchange-Rate, Monetary, and Financial Stability

The transition toward a market-determined exchange rate, together with a new monetary framework based on controlling the monetary base, seeks to correct accumulated distortions. The prohibition on new Central Bank financing to the Government helps contain inflationary and exchange-rate pressures. In addition, banking stress tests, asset-quality reviews, and strengthened supervision can reduce systemic risks.

Positive Aspect 3: Better Conditions for Private Investment

The review of regulatory frameworks in hydrocarbons and mining, the gradual elimination of export restrictions, the strengthening of property rights, and improvements in governance may help restore both domestic and foreign private investment. If these reforms are implemented with legal certainty and stable rules, Bolivia could regain productive, export, and formal job-creation capacity.

Negative Aspect 1: Fiscal Adjustment Impacting Economic Activity

The 8.5% of GDP adjustment is substantial and is concentrated during a period of significant economic weakness. Reductions in public spending, wage restraint, and delays in public investment may reduce domestic demand, affect government suppliers, and temporarily deepen the recession. The Memorandum itself acknowledges that economic activity will continue to contract in 2026 and would reach its lowest point in 2027.

Negative Aspect 2: Inflationary Risk from Exchange-Rate Adjustment and Fuel Prices

The exchange-rate transition and the elimination of subsidies may increase transportation, production, and distribution costs, which could later be passed on to food prices and other goods. The program itself recognizes that the adjustment of relative prices may delay disinflation and generate significant social risks. This makes the transition from a projected 14% inflation rate in 2026 to single-digit inflation by 2028 particularly challenging.

Negative Aspect 3: Higher Borrowing Costs and Financial Risks During the Transition

Restrictive monetary policy may increase interest rates and make financing more expensive for businesses and households. The Memorandum explicitly recognizes that the new monetary framework could generate interest-rate volatility and raise the Treasury’s domestic financing costs. Furthermore, the liberalization of interest rates may reveal asset-quality problems that had remained partially hidden under regulated conditions.

4. Three Important Risks Identified

Risk of Excessive Adjustment: Recession Plus Inflation

The main macroeconomic risk is that Bolivia could simultaneously face reduced public spending, lower public investment, more expensive credit, currency depreciation, and higher energy costs. This could result in a combination of recession, inflation, and employment deterioration, particularly during 2026–2027. The program itself acknowledges that GDP could continue contracting until reaching its lowest point in 2027. If the economy declines more than expected, fiscal revenues will fall, making it more difficult to meet deficit targets.

Exchange-Rate, Reserve, and Debt Risk

A further depreciation of the boliviano could increase the domestic cost of external debt and raise the prices of imported goods. At the same time, Bolivia has significant external obligations related to debt servicing and fuel imports. If external disbursements are delayed or exports lose momentum, usable reserves could remain under pressure. The program itself recognizes that liquid reserves start from low levels and that reserve accumulation depends in part on external financing.

Financial and Social Stability Risk

The transition toward a system with greater exchange-rate and interest-rate flexibility may reveal existing vulnerabilities in banks and businesses. The Memorandum recognizes risks related to asset quality, liquidity, deposit withdrawals, and currency mismatches. At the same time, the elimination of subsidies and price controls may generate social conflict if compensation mechanisms do not reach vulnerable households in a timely manner. The risk is that an economic problem could simultaneously become a financial and social crisis.

5. What Would Be Recommended to Reduce the Negative Impact on the Population?

My primary recommendation would be not to implement the adjustment as a simple across-the-board spending cut, but rather as a reengineering of public expenditure. The State should first eliminate unproductive spending, duplication, privileges, low-return projects, and structurally loss-making state-owned enterprises, while protecting critical infrastructure, healthcare, education, food programs, and employment-generation initiatives.

Second, the elimination of subsidies should be accompanied by automatic and temporary social compensation. I would not recommend waiting until the damage appears before providing assistance. The unified social registry should be operational before the main price adjustments take place and should identify poor households, informal workers, small producers, and sectors highly exposed to transportation costs. This is consistent with the Memorandum itself, which recognizes that social protection is essential to mitigating the impact of price liberalization.

Third, I recommend that restrictive monetary policy be gradual and dependent on actual inflation outcomes, avoiding an excessive contraction of productive credit. The objective should not simply be to reduce the monetary base, but to ensure that liquidity remains compatible with price stability without triggering a credit crisis.

Fourth, the Government should prioritize public investment with high economic and social returns, particularly in logistics infrastructure, energy, water, production, and connectivity. The program itself proposes that projects be evaluated through cost-benefit analysis and that those with the greatest positive externalities be prioritized.

Fifth, regarding private investment, the best anti-crisis policy would be to provide legal certainty, tax stability, clear rules, and administrative efficiency, especially in hydrocarbons, mining, agribusiness, energy, and export sectors. Private investment should progressively replace public spending as the main engine of growth.

Sixth, I recommend establishing a “social traffic-light system” for the program: if food inflation, unemployment, poverty, non-performing loans, or transportation costs exceed certain thresholds, the Government should automatically activate temporary compensatory measures. This would allow fiscal discipline to coexist with social stability.

Finally, there should be one fundamental rule: fiscal adjustment should fall primarily on unproductive spending, not on the real income of poor households. The program itself contemplates maintaining a minimum level of social spending; therefore, protecting vulnerable sectors should not be considered a residual expense, but rather a condition for making the program economically and politically sustainable.

6. Final Conclusion

The Memorandum represents a deep and necessary stabilization program, but one that carries significant risks during its initial phase. Its main strength lies in simultaneously addressing the fiscal deficit, monetary financing, exchange-rate distortions, public debt, inflation, and financial-sector weaknesses.

The objective of eliminating the primary deficit and reducing the overall deficit to 3.5% of GDP by 2029 could significantly improve the State’s solvency. It may also restore the credibility of the Central Bank of Bolivia and create better conditions for private investment.

However, the 8.5% of GDP adjustment is large enough to generate substantial economic and social costs. The elimination of subsidies, exchange-rate depreciation, and tighter monetary policy may simultaneously put pressure on prices, employment, and credit availability.

For this reason, the speed and quality of implementation will be just as important as the fiscal targets themselves. Success will depend on effectively protecting vulnerable households and preventing the adjustment from turning into a prolonged recession.

If the reforms succeed in stabilizing public finances, rebuilding reserves, attracting investment, and increasing productivity, Bolivia could emerge structurally stronger.

Consequently, this program is economically coherent and potentially necessary, but socially sensitive and financially demanding. Its success will depend on ensuring that stabilization is accompanied by growth, investment, social protection, and high-quality fiscal execution.

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