The IMF Is Not the Problem; Bolivia Is | El FMI no es el problema; el problema es Bolivia

By Fernando Untoja, Eju.tv:

Every time Bolivia faces an economic crisis, the same debate reappears. Some argue that an agreement with the International Monetary Fund represents a loss of sovereignty; others present it as the only possible way out. Both positions start from the same mistaken premise: they consider the IMF to be the center of the problem. It is not.

The real question should not be whether Bolivia should or should not turn to the International Monetary Fund. The decisive question is different: why does Bolivia repeatedly find itself needing the IMF?

Since the 1950s, the country has signed more than a dozen agreements with the institution under different arrangements. Nationalist, military, democratic, liberal, populist, and socialist governments have come and gone. Constitutions, political narratives, parties, and economic models have changed. Yet one constant remains: when the economy falls into a deep crisis, Bolivia returns to the same international lender.

This historical fact requires a shift in the focus of the debate.

The conventional explanation holds that the country turns to the IMF because it accumulates fiscal deficits, loses international reserves, increases its debt burden, and loses access to external financing. All of this is correct, but insufficient. These variables describe the visible effects of the crisis, not the reasons why the crisis reappears time and again.

The first cause lies in the persistence of a dysfunctional state. Since the founding of the Republic, Bolivia has failed to build institutions capable of guaranteeing continuity in public policy, fiscal discipline, legal certainty, and stable rules for investment. Every government seeks to refound the country; meanwhile, institutions remain weak.

The second cause lies in the structural heterogeneity of the Bolivian economy. The country is not organized according to a single economic logic. A capitalist economy based on competition coexists with a state-centered economy structured around political redistribution and a rivalry-based economy that responds to historically rooted forms of social organization. These rationalities do not integrate harmoniously; they interact through constant frictions that reduce productivity, hinder economic coordination, and limit the capacity to generate sustained growth.

The third cause is the recurring presence of populist governments that engage in discretionary distribution. During periods of prosperity, extraordinary surpluses are not transformed into permanent productive capacity. Instead, priority is given to expanding current spending, political subsidies, and rent distribution. When exceptional revenues disappear, fiscal deficits, foreign-exchange shortages, and indebtedness return.

The fourth cause is the absence of an economic model built upon Bolivia’s actual structure. For decades, theories and programs designed for other societies have been imported without understanding the specific functioning of the Bolivian economic machine. Economic policies have addressed immediate symptoms, but have rarely intervened in the structures that generate them.

This is precisely the limitation of the national debate. Fiscal deficits, exchange rates, and inflation are discussed, but not the institutional and economic architecture that periodically reproduces those same imbalances.

From this perspective, the International Monetary Fund takes on an entirely different meaning.

The IMF is not the cause of Bolivia’s crisis; it is the symptom of a much deeper problem. Its recurring presence reveals the accumulated failure of a state incapable of building a stable and self-sustaining economy. When a country turns, again and again for more than seven decades, to the same international lender to resolve similar crises, the real problem no longer lies with the financial institution. It lies in the political, institutional, and economic structure that cyclically reproduces the same imbalances. The IMF changes its programs; Bolivia repeats the same crisis.

This is the conceptual shift that the economic debate truly needs. The Fund should not be analyzed as the source of the nation’s difficulties, but rather as a historical indicator that the Bolivian economic machine has once again entered a phase of disequilibrium. Just as a physician does not confuse a thermometer with the illness, a serious analysis should not confuse the financial institution with the structural causes of the crisis.

Therefore, the discussion should not be reduced to deciding whether it is advisable to sign an agreement with the IMF. That decision belongs to the realm of short-term circumstances. The strategic challenge is to build a functional state, understand the structural heterogeneity of the Bolivian economy, and design a development model consistent with that reality. Until that happens, Bolivia will continue changing governments, narratives, and economic programs, yet it will periodically return to the same starting point.

History shows that countries do not overcome their crises simply by rejecting or accepting the IMF. They overcome them when they correct the structures that make recourse to the IMF necessary in the first place. The day Bolivia no longer needs to turn periodically to the International Monetary Fund will not be because it has defeated the IMF, but because it has succeeded in overcoming its own structural weaknesses.

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