La Tablada: The Battle That Sealed Tarija’s Course | La batalla que selló el rumbo de Tarija

By Omar Pereyra, Eju.tv:

Tarija was one of the last strongholds liberated by the Army of the Argentine North. The battle was led by the then young Gregorio Aráoz de Lamadrid, supported by local caudillos.

La Tablada: la batalla que selló el rumbo de Tarija

Illustration of the Battle of La Tablada

In Tarija, the days of freedom are counted from April 15, 1817. Although control of the central valley would change hands several times until independence was definitively consolidated, at that moment it became clear that there was no turning back.

The Battle of La Tablada was strategic because it cut off the royalist escape route from the Andean highlands toward the Chaco and the Río de la Plata plains. It is also part of the history linking this department with the Argentine independence process and, in particular, with one of its national heroes: Manuel Belgrano.

Belgrano (1770–1820) was a lawyer, economist, journalist, politician, diplomat, and military leader. Initially a defender of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata against the British invasions, he evolved toward a firm pro-independence stance, albeit with a constitutional monarchist vision that generated political tensions.

In May 1810 he was a central figure in the May Revolution. He participated in the open cabildo of May 22, voted for the removal of the viceroy, and on May 25 was appointed member of the Primera Junta, the seed of Argentina’s first national government.

Although not formally trained as a military officer, he assumed command of the Paraguay expedition and later of the Army of the North. From that position, he sought to consolidate the northern frontier of the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata and project influence toward Upper Peru.

Among his most singular proposals stands out the so-called “Inca Plan,” presented on July 6, 1816 before the Congress of Tucumán: a constitutional monarchy led by an Inca descendant, with a parliamentary system. The initiative, ridiculed by his contemporaries, responded to a political calculation: to attract the support of Andean populations to the independence process.

Along with José de San Martín and Bernardo de Monteagudo, he was one of the promoters of the Declaration of Independence of 1816.

Final Mission in the North

In August 1816, Belgrano resumed command of the Army of the North. Lacking conditions for a new expedition to Upper Peru, he entrusted a key mission: in March 1817 he sent Lieutenant Colonel Gregorio Aráoz de Lamadrid to Tarija, where he took part in the Battle of La Tablada and achieved the liberation of the city.

However, Lamadrid overestimated his possibilities and, with barely 400 men, attempted to seize Chuquisaca by surprise. He was defeated and had to retreat toward Tucumán, crossing mountains and jungle.

Belgrano remained in the north, sustaining the independence cause and containing internal conflicts in Salta and Tucumán. When the government ordered his return—along with San Martín—to control internal tensions, the latter disobeyed, while Belgrano, already ill, reduced his activity.

He arrived in Buenos Aires amid the so-called Anarchy of the Year XX, gravely affected by dropsy, the illness that caused his death on June 20, 1820.

The Roads to Independence

South American independence was consolidated years later thanks to coordinated advances from the south and north of the continent.

The Southern Liberating Expedition, led by José de San Martín from 1819, secured Chile’s independence after the battles of Chacabuco and Maipú, and later that of Peru in 1821.

In parallel, Simón Bolívar led the northern campaign, achieving decisive victories such as Boyacá and Carabobo, which consolidated the independence of Colombia and Venezuela, and later Ecuador.

The process culminated in 1824 with the Battle of Ayacucho, where independence forces under Antonio José de Sucredefinitively defeated royalist power in South America.

What Happened Next in Tarija?

When Bolivia was constituted as a republic on August 6, 1825, Tarija had already exercised de facto independence for at least 16 years, according to Miguel Molina, and likely longer. The “Tarija question” dates back almost to its founding and had a key moment in 1807, when, in an open cabildo, Tarijeños rose against Spanish administration, demanding separation from the Potosí intendancy but also rejecting incorporation into Salta del Tucumán. The seed of independence was already present.

This process resulted from prolonged administrative neglect, except in military matters. Molina argues that Tarija governed itself during the independence struggle and did not depend politically or economically on either Upper Peru or the Río de la Plata. Although there was coordination with military columns from both regions in specific campaigns—such as Suipacha or Cotagaita—he emphasizes that independence cannot be attributed to external forces, but rather to Tarija’s own actions.

In that context, Tarija, Potosí, and northern Argentina became the final stage of royalist resistance, awaiting reinforcements that never arrived due to the European crisis. Meanwhile, the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata had already consolidated independence in 1816. Tarija, however, resisted submission to Salta—though there are historiographical disagreements—both because of troops sent from there and the influence of José María Pérez de Urdininea, who promoted the emancipation cause.

At the beginning of 1825, Urdininea, under orders from Juan Antonio Álvarez de Arenales, participated in a campaign in Upper Peru. After the death of Pedro Antonio Olañeta, he broke from Arenales and advanced northward, receiving the surrender of the last royalist commander in the region, José María Valdez. He later joined the circle of Antonio José de Sucre, who entrusted him with command responsibilities.

At the same time, Simón Bolívar announced his arrival in Upper Peru to restore order, while Sucre called for an Assembly after crossing the Desaguadero, generating tensions with Buenos Aires. Sucre tasked the Irish general Francisco Burdett O’Connor with expanding territorial control; he reached Tarija and promoted its separation from Argentina, consolidating his influence in the region.

Faced with this scenario, the United Provinces decided to grant autonomy to the Upper Peruvian provinces, but not to Tarija, whose conflict remained tied to Salta. Arenales attempted to reassert authority, although Tarija already showed a clear autonomous will. A movement then emerged led by Bernardo Trigo and Eustaquio Méndez, backed by O’Connor, which in practice sought incorporation into Upper Peru.

Despite instructions from Bolívar and Sucre not to intervene, O’Connor removed Governor Felipe Echazú in May 1825 and installed Trigo, who promoted the election of representatives for the Upper Peruvian Assembly. However, Tarija was not convened as an independent entity, and Bolivia was constituted without its participation.

Arenales tried to regain control, and in October 1825 an Argentine delegation presented its claims before Bolívar in Potosí, who accepted them after deliberation, possibly without fully considering Tarija’s will. In February 1826, Tarija was handed over to Argentine delegate Ciriaco Díaz Vélez, but the local cabildo requested autonomy.

The situation led to new conflicts: Arenales appointed Mariano Gordaliza as governor, while the arrest of Eustaquio Méndez, ordered in coordination with O’Connor, sparked a montonero rebellion. They deposed the imposed authority, restored Trigo, and declared their adherence to Bolivia on August 26, 1826.

Finally, in September of that year, Tarija’s deputies were admitted in Chuquisaca, and on October 3 Antonio José de Sucreenacted the law that formalized its incorporation into Bolivia’s Constituent Congress. The war between the United Provinces and Brazil facilitated this outcome.

Nevertheless, tensions persisted. Tarija’s representatives also participated in the Argentine Congress of 1826, which recognized Tarija as a province, although this decision was never implemented in practice, just like the initial aspiration to become an independent entity within the new South American order.

Key Figures of the Battle of La Tablada

Eustaquio Méndez
Known as “Moto,” he was Tarija’s main independence leader. He actively participated in the Battle of La Tablada alongside the forces sent by Belgrano and in multiple guerrilla actions. His organizational role was decisive in consolidating resistance and securing victory over royalists.

Gregorio Aráoz de Lamadrid
Born in Tucumán in 1795, he was a bold young officer who joined Belgrano’s army. Sent to Tarija, he led the attack at La Tablada that defeated royalist forces. He later attempted to advance on Chuquisaca, where he was defeated. His career was marked by risky actions and mixed results.

Francisco Pérez de Uriondo
A Chilean-born military and politician, he was a key figure in the gaucho war and in coordinating Tarija’s caudillos. He became governor by popular vote and played a significant role in the political organization of the territory, keeping it within the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata.

The Royalist Capitulation; The Beginning of Freedom

After the skirmish at La Tablada, Commander Gregorio Aráoz de Lamadrid recalls in his memoirs that he returned victorious to the San Roque camp amid thunderous cheers from his soldiers and the people who followed him. He then ordered the release of wounded prisoners, instructing them to inform their commander that with only 35 hussars he had defeated more than 140 of their men, and that they had no choice but to surrender or perish within their trenches, which would soon be assaulted.

Lamadrid then moved with all artillery and infantry to the San Juan hill, ordering a ceasefire to observe the effect of the prisoners’ report. Noticing officers running in the plaza and convening a council of commanders, he sent aide Manuel Cainzo with a summons to Lieutenant Colonel and Commander of the Tarija garrison, Mateo Ramírez, stating:

“It has never been improper for honorable officers to surrender unconditionally when they have no means of support nor hope of assistance, as you do. Neither Lubin nor O’Reilly, to whom you have written for this purpose, can do so because they lack the strength to withstand mine. Therefore, you may confirm your surrender, with the understanding that you, your officers, and troops will be treated with all the esteem and distinction befitting my character. If you do not, I will verify what I stated in my dispatch yesterday within five minutes. I assume you are already aware of the fate of Commander Malacabeza, given the prisoners I have sent you, but I inform you nonetheless: there are 65 dead, 40 prisoners, and 70 rifles captured. All of this proves your own ruin and leads me to believe that no more blood will be shed. May God grant you many years. -San Juan Heights, April 15, 1817.”

After a few moments, Lieutenant Cainzo returned, bearing the following reply:

“Having seen your official communication, which I have just received, in which you issue a second ultimatum, anticipating that you have denied the appeals requested from Lubin and O’Relly, due to the seizure, as is implied, of the dispatches I sent to them, I reply that this reason is not sufficient to cause me or my officers to falter in defending His Majesty’s arms in this stronghold to the last, as I still have sufficient forces, well-equipped with what is necessary, as you will see. However, the defeat suffered by the cavalry squadron compels me to enter into capitulation, consulting with the conscience of both divisions, if you will accept it under the following terms: 1. That all members of this garrison be received as prisoners with the honors of war, and that officers be allowed to carry their swords, permitting us to take our baggage to the prisoner depot. 2. That the civilians…” Those of us who have committed to taking up arms shall be treated well, allowing them to live alongside their families. 3rd. –That only regular troops enter the Plaza, preventing any disorder in the town. Under these terms, and persuaded that you, as an honorable officer, know how to observe what has been proposed, we have unanimously agreed, and I await notification of your acceptance. –Tarija, April 15, 1817. –“.

Reply to the previous proposal:

“In your letter, which I have just received, I have seen fit to accept the surrender of that plaza, under the three articles proposed, out of a generosity characteristic of the American spirit, with the understanding that you must immediately leave with the entire garrison to surrender your arms at the field of Las Carreras, located east of the town, with your respective commanders and officers. –May God grant you many years. –Alto de San Juan, April 15, 1817. Gregorio Aráoz de La Madrid.”

Consequently, a short time later, 300 men, led by their commanders and officers, surrendered their weapons to the Argentine flag in the field known as “Las Carreras” in the town of Tarija. Among them were a colonel, three lieutenant colonels, sixteen officers, and three hundred soldiers of the Cuzco Grenadier Regiment. The spoils of this splendid victory included 400 rifles, 140 weapons of all kinds, 8 ammunition boxes, a flag, and numerous other military supplies.

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