The Bleak Future | El sombrío futuro

By Antonio Saravia, Eju.tv:

Supreme Decree (DS) 5516 came to light last Tuesday the 13th after an announcement by Minister Lupo in which it was revealed that the new regulation had been reviewed “article by article with the COB” in the early hours of that morning. Yes, you read that right: the COB ended up approving even the commas of the new decree and rushing the minister, who had a 48-hour deadline to publish it in the Gazette.

That demand came after the embarrassing meeting on Sunday the 11th in El Alto between the ministers, the COB, and its ranks. The Sunday meeting was embarrassing because, through cell phones and TV channels, the entire country was able to watch live the government’s capitulation and retreat in a chaotic staging that also exposed ministers who were helpless and humiliated by the shouts, slogans, and insults of the hosts. The government that days earlier accused those same union leaders of being corrupt and mafioso-like ultimately had to meet with them and accept their demand: the repeal of DS 5503.

Yes, we already know that the essence of DS 5503—the lifting of the fuel subsidy—was maintained, and that is why the government says it scored a victory. What is true, however, is that the COB dealt it an important political defeat. The men with helmets bearing Che Guevara stickers and coca wads in their mouths forced it to retreat after a show of strength that revived them as a political movement. Eliminating the fuel subsidy was necessary and the entire country supported it, but it was only the first step toward restoring macroeconomic stability. Much more remains to be done, and the government’s retreat sets a disastrous precedent for the future. Now the general feeling is that it will not be able to do anything important without the COB’s approval. The COB (and consequently the entire political apparatus of masismo/evismo) has made its strength and veto power very clear.

This forecasts a bleak future because our economy has not come out of the hole—far from it. Lifting the fuel subsidy is a good measure, but it only solves about 33% of the fiscal deficit. There is still 66% left to resolve, and that can only be achieved by cutting more public spending. The next step should be the elimination of state-owned enterprises. As I explained in a previous column, the combined deficit of public enterprises is around USD 2.4 billion, so closing many of them would allow us to solve another third of the fiscal deficit. The key question is: will the government be able to embark on a deep reform of company closures, plant shutdowns, layoffs, and the like, when it has the COB breathing down its neck? I see that as difficult.

And what about the remaining third? What will happen when the government seriously takes on the reduction of the state bureaucracy, which should be the next step? In short, will the government be able to cut about USD 4 billion in public spending in order to reach a zero deficit? Again, with the COB having clearly shown that it holds the sword of Damocles aloft, I see it as very difficult.

You may ask why the obsession with reaching a zero deficit. The obsession—and the urgency—of closing the fiscal gap has to do with the fact that the Central Bank no longer has reserves. Every fiscal deficit, therefore, is covered exclusively with inorganic issuance, which inevitably causes inflation, devaluation, and macroeconomic instability. In short, every fiscal deficit keeps pushing us deeper into the crisis.

One possibility is that deficits be financed with external debt, but this is a very dangerous bet. First, because the debt and its interest have to be paid someday, meaning we are simply kicking the problem down the road. Second, because unless a broad agreement is reached with the IMF, most of the loans that are arriving for now (CAF, IDB, etc.) are not freely available and are tied to specific investment projects. That is, they are loans to keep on spending.

So there are not many alternatives. The government will have to make a strong spending adjustment until the fiscal deficit is closed, and that will require political consensus, authority, and a firm hand. The problem is that the COB has shown us that the government has everything except that.

The future is bleak also because not only will it be very difficult to close the fiscal gap, but what little has been done so far has been achieved by loading the burden exclusively onto citizens. The elimination of the subsidy is paid by us at the pump, not by the government. But it is worse than you imagine. Brace yourself. Twenty-three percent of the new gasoline price, and 35% of the new diesel price, correspond to the payment of the Special Tax on Hydrocarbons and Derivatives (IEHD) (Article 9 of Annex 1 of DS 5516). In other words, on top of transferring the heavy backpack of adjustment onto us, they pile on more weight so the government can collect some nice money. If we consider that approximately 6 million liters of gasoline and 7 million liters of diesel are consumed per day, in addition to paying for the fuel hike, we will be paying the government around Bs. 34 million, or USD 3.4 million, per day. Adjustment and blows on our backs. I repeat: eliminating the subsidy was necessary, but why must we pay additional taxes to the government for buying energy?

Will we ever see the government—that is, the political class—also carrying the backpack? So far, not a single public enterprise has been closed and not one bureaucrat has been fired, and what is worse, as I say above, I do not think the government will be able to do it. In short, nothing has really happened here: the masista model of an elephantine state that the private sector has to sustain remains intact.

Antonio Saravia is PhD in economics (Twitter: @tufisaravia)

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