The Economic Dilemma of the PDC | El dilema económico del PDC

By Gonzalo Colque, Vision 360:

In any case, we will soon find out what secrets the decrees hold. We are on the verge of discovering the direction the PDC will take.

Although the crisis persists, in recent weeks there has been an apparent economic calm. The restocking of gasoline —and to a lesser extent, diesel— has deactivated the escalation of conflicts. Even the prices of some imported goods have begun to fall, in direct response to the moderation of the parallel dollar. The efforts of the president-elect have also contributed to a climate of expectation and confidence.

However, behind this calm there is no real stability, but rather repressed inflation. Artificially low prices are sustained by a complex network of subsidies, state interventions and controls, fuels financed with gold reserves, public debt, and an unsustainable fiscal deficit. The new government inherits a pressure cooker on the verge of exploding and faces a crucial economic dilemma: continue repressing inflation or allow prices to adjust to reality, assuming all the political cost that the latter entails.

Rodrigo Paz and his team have focused their attention on trying to resolve the fuel shortage and secure sources of external financing. That is, they have been concerned with fulfilling their promise to “guarantee gasoline and diesel from day one.” But as the adage goes, “the urgent is rarely the important.”

What truly matters is defining the economic course. And in that regard, the PDC has been ambiguous. It promised to control inflation and, at the same time, spoke of liberalizing prices. Both goals are desirable and legitimate, but in practice they are incompatible. One cannot stabilize without letting the economy adjust to reality, nor allow adjustment without inflation. Although it announced a “package of decrees” for the first few days, this offers no clarity, since the contents are closely guarded.

Even though secrecy prevents us from anticipating their true scope, at least three possible interpretations arise.

First, the PDC may be opting to buy time by postponing fiscal adjustment decrees—avoiding premature political wear, delaying important decisions, and leaning toward palliative measures to “protect the people’s pocket.” In that case, we could expect a low-impact adjustment program. The package could focus on reducing ministries, cutting expenses, announcing the closure of deficit-ridden state companies, lowering fuel import costs, or approving tax amnesties. It would be a pragmatic package, useful to demonstrate action and political will, but insufficient to reverse the crisis.

Second, the PDC may have decided to let prices adjust from the start. If so, the secrecy would be part of a tactic to prevent early reactions and negative repercussions before the announcement. The main signs that this path has been chosen would be two measures: increases in fuel prices and a devaluation of the official exchange rate. Essentially, this would mean freeing prices, which would lead to a sharp conversion of repressed inflation into open inflation. Such a move carries high social costs, and thus would need to be accompanied by compensatory measures targeted at the poorest sectors.

Third, the PDC may not yet have made a firm decision and could be trapped in the illusion of trying to resolve the crisis without assuming costs. The problem is that there is no solution without economic or political costs. Adjusting the economy implies loss of purchasing power for all Bolivians, political erosion for the government, and social instability. If the PDC chooses ambiguity—trying to repress inflation while simultaneously attempting to adjust prices—the result would be disastrous: the crisis would worsen and could spiral into chaotic inflation.

A sensible way out would be an orderly transition to move past repressed inflation. But that cannot be done by decree; it requires a visionary strategy or plan combining three key elements: fiscal discipline, broad political consensus, and effective economic communication. Rodrigo Paz has the aptitude and intuition to lead such a roadmap. He acts pragmatically, surrounds himself with a competent technical team, and shows an ability for political dialogue.

However, the third element remains absent: communication with transparency and pedagogy. Economics for all, rather than capitalism for all. In times of crisis, speaking about the economy to the people is as decisive as the measures themselves or the political agreements. Public confidence cannot be decreed—it must be built by truthfully and clearly explaining what the economic measures consist of, the reasons behind them, their costs, and their benefits. It’s not about merely informing, but about two-way communication that inspires people to shoulder the burden. Right now, many are willing to accept sacrifices, but in return, they want to make sure it’s worth it. It’s not about asking for patience or a few months of grace, but about inspiring collective commitment.

In any case, we will soon find out what secrets the decrees hold. We are about to learn the direction the PDC will take and whether its team can translate Rodrigo Paz’s potential into a deliberate and careful strategy. If they manage to harmonize the three dimensions—the technical, the political, and the social pedagogy—Bolivia could escape the threat of being trapped in an inflationary spiral and begin an orderly transition toward lasting stability.

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