Ruling with Alliances | Gobernar con Alianzas

By Los Tiempos:

The new president of the State must seek alliances in the Congress

The candidates are obliged to debate in the second round. | Wilson Cahuaya/Los Tiempos

How will the new Government face governance? just as defined by political scientists: “the capacity of the political system to make collective decisions, implement them effectively, and maintain institutional stability in the face of society’s demands and external pressures.”

The next president of Bolivia, whether Rodrigo Paz or Jorge Tuto Quiroga, will have to achieve the necessary consensus in the Legislative Assembly to obtain a majority of votes in the legislature (for ordinary laws) and two-thirds of the votes for more important issues such as the appointment of high-ranking authorities or reforms to the Political Constitution of the State (CPE).

And the only alliance that works to obtain two-thirds of the votes is that of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) with the Libre Alliance.

Two-thirds of the votes in the Assembly are required for issues such as approving partial constitutional reforms, convening a Constituent Assembly, electing magistrates of the Supreme Court of Justice, the Plurinational Constitutional Court, the Agro-Environmental Court, and the Council of the Magistracy (pre-selection), appointing the Attorney General of the State, the Comptroller General of the State, the Ombudsman, and others.

On the other hand, for the approval of ordinary laws, resolutions, and declarations, an absolute majority or a simple majority is sufficient, depending on the case.

The following are evaluations by political analysts regarding the possibilities of governance in the Legislative Assembly—

On November 9 a Legislature will take office that, although it appears renewed and diverse, arrives deeply fragmented, without a force that has an absolute majority. The Christian Democratic Party (PDC) is the first caucus, but it will not be able to govern alone: it needs to weave alliances with Libre, Unidad, and other smaller forces to guarantee governance and avoid a scenario of political paralysis, analysts Carlos Borth, Rafael Archondo, and María Teresa Zegada agreed.

The Legislature is made up of 65 legislators from the PDC; 51 from the Libre Alliance; 33 from Unidad; 8 from Popular Alliance; 6 from APB Súmate; 2 from MAS; and one representative of an Indigenous people; in this scenario, the absolute majority would be achieved with 84 representatives, and two-thirds with 111. (See infographic)

The next administration must approve urgent laws to respond to the economic crisis, recover institutionalism, and address the social conflict left by the previous political cycle.

Analyst Carlos Borth warns that the first decisions, such as the election of the presidencies of the chambers and the boards of directors, will be a thermometer of the articulation capacity of the new ruling bloc. “The composition of the Assembly is heterogeneous and quite complex. The party that came in first place, the PDC, does not reach a majority in either chamber and requires an alliance to gather a majority,” he explains.

Borth points out that the situation is even more challenging when thinking about constitutional reforms or changes to the Framework Law of Autonomies, which require the vote of two-thirds of the total legislators: “If the PDC wins the second round, it will necessarily have to reach an agreement with Libre and possibly with Unidad to reach two-thirds. It is a complex political task that will test the maturity of the leadership and the cohesion of the caucuses.”

Journalist and analyst Rafael Archondo agrees that conditions exist for the next government to achieve governance, but warns that the type of majority built will mark the country’s course:

“Only the PDC and Libre together can reach two-thirds and guarantee the most important State appointments that have been pending for the last 20 years. But to approve laws, a simple majority is enough. The dilemma is whether the country will settle for a government that barely manages to approve ordinary laws or whether it will opt for a super-majority coalition to tackle fundamental changes in the Constitution and in economic policy.”

Archondo warns that the campaign period towards the second round could complicate future agreements, since the two main blocs must face each other to win votes: “There are no major programmatic differences between the PDC and Libre, but the electoral logic pushes them to compete and discredit each other. This can make alliance-building more difficult after October 19.”

For Borth, the greatest risk facing governance is indiscipline and political fragmentation: “There is fear that the phenomenon of internal indiscipline will be repeated. Many legislators do not respond either to the party or the candidate that brought them to power, but rather to personal or regional interests.”

Sociologist María Teresa Zegada reinforces this concern by warning that the current Assembly is not made up of parties in the classic sense, but of coalitions of individuals. “We are facing a multiparty system with high fragmentation. The forces that reach the Legislature are alliances of personalities rather than organic structures. This can result in a chaotic parliament, without a clear political line, where many legislators act individually.”

To face these problems, the next government must adopt measures that could be unpopular and that will require parliamentary support. “A government with a stable and homogeneous parliamentary base is needed to support the policies to be implemented. If that cohesion does not exist, measures could be stalled and worsen the crisis,” warns Borth.

Zegada adds that it would be desirable to build agreements even before the election of the presidential ticket: “There are national challenges that cannot be delayed: economic recovery, rebuilding the social fabric, and reinstitutionalizing the country. If the new Assembly dedicates itself to obstruction, governance can become extremely complicated.”

In the context of the political and legislative debate towards the second round, it becomes relevant to understand in which cases the Plurinational Legislative Assembly (ALP) requires a qualified two-thirds (2/3) majority to approve key State decisions.

According to the Political Constitution of the State (CPE) and the internal regulations of the ALP, two-thirds of the votes of the members present are necessary to approve decisions of high institutional and constitutional relevance. Among these cases are partial constitutional reform, the appointment of high-ranking State authorities (such as the Ombudsman, the Comptroller General, the Attorney General, or members of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal), as well as authorization for trials of responsibilities against high authorities, including the President and the Vice President of the State.

This qualified majority is also required for the approval of strategic international agreements, the disqualification of the president due to physical or mental incapacity, and to authorize state intervention in mixed or private companies in strategic sectors.

Unlike these decisions, ordinary laws, such as economic, budgetary, or administrative ones, are usually approved by an absolute majority, that is, more than half of the legislators present.

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