The existence of “chola” or “cunumi” bourgeoisies | La existencia de burguesías “chola” o “cunumi”

Carlos Toranzo Roca, Brujula Digital:

Economic Elites Beyond the Aristocracy

There is a prejudice in Bolivia that suggests economic elites have always come from the country’s aristocratic landowning class, from the oligarchies. However, empirical analysis shows that since the early days, starting with Simón I. Patiño, the tin baron who internationalized very early on, to the current “chola” bourgeoisie, owners of capital circulation channels, vast mansions [cholets] in El Alto, and metalworking industries in Santa Cruz; as well as wealthy merchants in La Cancha, Cochabamba, who own interdepartmental and international transport, economic elites from popular sectors have always existed.

There are also those emerging from foreign immigrants who did not always come from aristocratic or wealthy families but rather from poor sectors that through hard work became owners of hardware stores, bakeries, shoe factories, candy factories, and became part of other branches of the country’s economic elite.

Patiño is not the only mixed-race entrepreneur from popular sectors who excelled in mining at the beginning of the 20th century; there are many more like him, but history has either not brought them to light or, in some cases, incorporated them into the entrepreneurial class of the oligarchic sectors. In Bolivia, there was a great prejudice against believing that popular sectors could not become part of the large business or bourgeois class of our country. It’s no wonder that 30 years ago Bolivian sociology was reluctant to acknowledge the existence of “chola” or “cunumi” bourgeoisies, which were very successful and possessed much more significant capital than several fractions of the traditional bourgeoisies.

That sociology understood that popular sectors necessarily had to be poor; it did not comprehend that brown-skinned capitalists had already risen to become the new bourgeoisies of our country. Many analysts understood that the Great Power festivities were merely ritualistic, with folkloric characteristics, for reaffirming popular identities, but they did not understand that it was the public stage for the “chola” bourgeoisies, where, in addition to dancing, significant economic transactions took place. It should not be forgotten that those present were those who early on engaged in trade with China, and those responsible for imports coming through Brazil, Peru, Chile, or Argentina also said “present.”

Moreover, the connection between political and economic elites is deeply rooted throughout national history, spanning from the old feudalism of the late 19th century to the current process of change. In the 19th century and the first part of the 20th century, it was more than evident that these economic elites were, at the same time, the political elites. In the second half of the 20th century, wasn’t Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and several accompanying businessmen evidence of this?

History also shows how in certain periods, such as the beginning of the National Revolution and the current process of change, there were and are economic elites stemming from union aristocracies. During the MNR, a good portion of the “emenerrista” union leaders, those who received quotas from the ruling party, became part of the economic elites who also served as political elites.

In the 21st century, transport workers, coca growers, a portion of traders, and mining cooperatives are part of Bolivia’s new economic elites. Aren’t they also political elites? Indeed, they are, as they are part of the corporatist distribution of political power; hence their representatives appear as deputies, senators, ministers, deputy ministers, governors, mayors, councilors. Once again, economic elites are intertwined with political elites and often share both functions. Bolivian social science must rid itself of analytical prejudices and begin by adequately describing Bolivia’s economic and political elites; in doing so, it will encounter surprises.

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