The Cultural Battle and the Plunder of Bolivia’s Gas | La batalla cultural y el saqueo del gas en Bolivia

By Álvaro Ríos, Brujula Digital:

During the 50 days of the recent criminal blockades in Bolivia, I came to understand that the cultural battle waged by the so-called anti-capitalist left remains as relevant as ever and continues to hold an unchallenged hegemony. Rodrigo Paz won political power, but he did not win the battle of ideas—the narrative—and that is why his effort to rescue the country from the deep energy and economic collapse he inherited will be an uphill struggle and may ultimately become his downfall.

During those fateful 50 days, I observed that, beyond demands for the government’s resignation, the Bolivian Workers’ Center (COB) and other social movements aligned with former president Evo Morales promoted a series of slogans that have shaped Bolivia’s political narrative over the past 25 years. These ideas deserve examination.

The most significant—and the one that struck me the most—was the claim that the current government is moving toward handing over Bolivia’s natural resources to be plundered. Among the resources mentioned were lithium, rare earth minerals, hydrocarbons, and others. In practical terms, the narrative amounts to a categorical rejection of new mining, lithium, and hydrocarbon legislation designed to attract private investment.

This argument is deeply cynical. During the 20 years of MAS rule, approximately 12 TCF (trillion cubic feet) of natural gas and about 360 million barrels of oil and condensates were extracted. These reserves had been discovered during the final decade of the 1990s, thanks to an investment-friendly model that successfully attracted capital to the country.

Unfortunately, under the state-led model, Bolivia’s natural gas reserves had fallen by the end of 2025 to an estimated 2.3 TCF, while liquid hydrocarbon reserves stood at just 8 million barrels. Natural gas production declined from 61 million cubic meters per day in 2015 to 24 million in 2025, and by 2029 the country is expected to begin importing gas.

In 2026, domestic demand for liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) has already overtaken supply, making imports necessary from now on, despite the fact that Bolivia once exported millions of tons of the fuel. Gas and liquid hydrocarbons were depleted, reserves were not replenished through new investment, and the country was left energy bankrupt—dependent on imports and short of foreign currency.

What is even more difficult to comprehend about this rhetoric from the self-proclaimed left is its disregard for how the revenues were spent. Between 2005 and 2025, Bolivia earned approximately $65 billion from exports of natural gas, LPG, and reconstituted crude oil. The gas wealth simply vanished in the country of gas. At the current pace, unless major reforms are implemented to attract new investment, Bolivia could be importing around $5.5 billion worth of energy annually by 2035.

Another narrative frequently heard during the blockades concerned the supposed “sell-off” or privatization of the many state-owned companies created over the past two decades. The reality is that YPFB was plundered in virtually every possible way during the MAS years. The company was forced to drill “patriotic wells” and build all kinds of facilities without feasibility studies—plants that were unnecessary, poorly located, lacking raw materials, awarded without proper bidding processes, and often accompanied by kickbacks.

Political interference and corruption have left YPFB in an unsustainable position. Yet there are still demands to preserve these enterprises, even though most operate at a loss and are effectively unmanageable. ENDE has not escaped this reality either. The government now finds itself trapped, unsure of how to proceed, because the narrative has prevailed over reality.

A third major theme in the narrative is the claim that energy subsidies are being removed to make ordinary people suffer. What is conveniently forgotten is that former president Evo Morales once raised fuel prices himself, only to reverse the decision. Fortunately for him, he still had substantial gas and condensate reserves that provided the foreign currency needed to support the subsidies. Later, Luis Arce sought to hold a referendum on removing subsidies. Once again, the narrative prevailed, and energy subsidies remain politically untouchable.

A fourth element of the narrative is the demand that there be no fuel shortages while simultaneously insisting that Bolivia should neither turn to the IMF nor seek financing from other international institutions to secure energy supplies. During the MAS administrations, Bolivia’s internal and external debt rose from $7 billion in 2005 to $46 billion in 2025, despite the enormous revenues generated by hydrocarbon exports.

Unless President Paz’s government gains the political strength to overturn this deeply entrenched left-wing narrative—that it is always the political right that plunders natural resources, removes subsidies, and closes money-losing state enterprises—it will find it extremely difficult to implement reforms, attract investment, and revive the economy. In the meantime, energy shortages will continue.

Álvaro Ríos is a former Minister of Hydrocarbons of Bolivia and currently Managing Partner of Gas Energy Latin America.

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