Usual Political Customs in Bolivia | Costumbres políticas usuales en Bolivia

By Carlos Toranzo, Brujula Digital:

Racism has been one of the political customs that has run throughout the entirety of Bolivian history, joining the centuries-old discrimination of indigenous and popular sectors by oligarchies or aristocracies. If more than a century ago aristocracies discriminated against Indians, in the 21st century urban popular sectors and popular mestizos discriminated against those who came from the countryside; thus, the mark of discrimination is not something peculiar only to aristocracies.

The greatest surprise is that in the 21st century, under the influence of the ideas of the MAS government that attempted to racialize politics, the inverse phenomenon occurred: peasants or indigenous people discriminated against urban inhabitants, whom, according to them, had white skin. The work of Gabriel René Moreno summarizes an aristocratic idea of power, of discrimination against the popular classes.

Alcides Arguedas is the archetype of ideas of discrimination against the Indian, as he believed they were the problem in Bolivia, although in Raza de bronce he shows another side and justifies the burning of the hacienda by the Indians. On the other hand, Franz Tamayo vindicates indigenous people; nevertheless, he places discriminatory reservations on the mestizo world, especially toward the cholos.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the liberals carried out an educational reform that tended to “civilize” Bolivians. It focused on Indians, whose minds and bodies were to be shaped through a new European gymnastics. For this purpose, they hired a Belgian mission led by George Rouma to define the contents of future Bolivian education.

For his part, Carlos Medinaceli, with La Chaskañawi, makes a profound vindication of mestizos, avoiding the racist criteria of other authors. Without this trio of intellectuals, it is difficult to understand the politics and political culture of the 20th century.

The culture of dispossession and victimization is present in the mentality of Bolivians. The culture of plunder is linked to that of victimization; we are always victims of someone, of others’ conspiracies; we do not possess the capacity to analyze our own limitations or errors. No—the guilty are always outside; it is never us.

We lost the War of the Pacific, according to popular understanding, because of the excessive economic interests of the Chileans; the Chaco War ended in defeat, according to Bolivians, due to the interests of imperialisms and their oil companies. In other words, there is a blindness to what we Bolivians ourselves did.

In domestic politics, those in power and politicians say they do not make mistakes; rather, others are to blame for the failures of governments. We do eternally badly because of others. It was a recurring idea of those in power during the MAS government to present Bolivia as a victim of the rich, of the k’aras, of imperialism, or of neoliberalism.

Years of MAS governments passed, but instead of acknowledging its failures, it always explained that all its setbacks were the fault of imperialism, of neoliberalism—that, because we are a poor country, those powers humiliated us, and that they have done so for centuries.

When the coward Morales fled, he did not accept his errors; he only claimed that it was a conspiracy of the empire that removed him from power. In Bolivian politics, self-criticism has no place; politicians do not have the capacity to accept their mistakes. They did not do so two centuries ago, and they continue committing that sin. A country that does not look at its own errors, that does not carry out self-criticism of its actions and conduct, will hardly be able to advance.

The idea of socialist revolution has been present in Bolivian politics since the Russian Revolution of 1917, developing with variants corresponding to what occurred in Mao’s China and with the events of the Cuban Revolution. These ideas influenced the practice of several parties in Bolivia and of the ELN. A good part of the labor movement adhered to these ideas, as did radicalized middle classes.

Since the 1960s, many NGOs accepted the idea of socialist revolution and tried to follow that path. Leftist parties, since the 1930s, adhered to those ideas. The arrival of the Cuban Revolution increased, especially among middle classes and youth sectors, ideas linked to the acceptance of socialist revolution.

The concept of the feudal bourgeoisie has been transcendental from 1940 onward; it was used to define the power of that era. There is no full certainty about who used it first, but both Marxist parties and revolutionary nationalism used it to define the oligarchic State that prevailed until 1952.

Another political concept that defined the oligarchic State is that of la rosca, which expressed how power was enclosed within a small circle limited to landholding elites and mining control—elements also explained by the concept of the feudal bourgeoisie. But if this concept articulated feudalism and capitalism, along the same lines ran the recovery of the idea of uneven and combined development used by Trotskyist thinkers to analyze Bolivian society.

Both Lora and Ayala Mercado based their analyses on the use of that concept. But thinkers of revolutionary nationalism, including Paz Estenssoro, also appealed to that category. In the case of René Zavaleta, his well-known idea of Bolivia as a “motley society” (sociedad abigarrada) is a variant of uneven and combined development; yet he also speaks of the motley condition alongside the use of the category of proletarian centrality. At one time, Zavaleta embraced the idea of socialist revolution, which is why he privileged the role of the mining proletariat as the historical subject that would carry out revolutionary transformations. His notion of proletarian centrality refers to the importance that this proletariat had for him, somewhat diluting the idea of the motley society.

Both uneven and combined development and the motley condition led to the idea of a multiclass party, which was opposed to proletarian centrality. Tristán Marof was one of the first to bet on that line. The MNR was the party that most strongly promoted the idea of a multiclass party; under that ideological mantle it carried out the April Revolution.

There are two transcendental documents for the political history of Bolivia in the 20th century—on one hand, the Thesis of Pulacayo (1946), which states that the strategic path of the labor movement is the advance toward socialism through a proletarian revolution. After the Revolution, the COB adopted that thesis as its own; its ideas have been present in the imagination of the labor movement and of radicalized middle classes until the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st.

The counter-thesis is the Manifesto to the Electors of Ayopaya—a political document of the MNR written by Walter Guevara Arze. This text does not propose socialism; rather, without denying class struggle, it points to a democratic-bourgeois revolution carried out on the basis of a multiclass party.

Perhaps the Thesis of Pulacayo had greater ideological impact on leftist thought and especially among mining workers; however, the guidelines of Walter Guevara Arze’s manifesto are those that materialized in the Revolution of 1952—that is, this thesis had practical value of importance.

Nevertheless, the ideas of both are intertwined. Not in vain, everything related to dual power or the MNR-COB co-government is the history of the early years of that Revolution. Precisely for that reason, many Trotskyist leaders, militants of the POR, practiced entryism—they entered the MNR with the intention of radicalizing the Revolution so that it would move from the democratic-bourgeois stage toward socialism.

However, the MNR absorbed the entryists and the Revolution did not radicalize; on the contrary, the former POR militants became members of the MNR. In any case, entryism remained in force at other moments in the country’s political history; without it, popular participation and gender policies during the government of Sánchez de Lozada cannot be explained.

Carlos Toranzo is an economist.

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