By Oscar Antezana, El Dia:

This is the third time I’ve rewritten the text of this article. The first version I wrote before October 18, thinking that Tuto Quiroga was going to win the presidential election. The title of that article was “Letter to Hope.” Then, with Rodrigo Paz’s victory, I changed the text and the title became “Paz in His Labyrinth.” This is the third attempt at publication, and what gave rise to the new title has justified yet another revision.

More than the speed of events or the political and economic expectations in these four or five days, I want to highlight the unconditional support that Tuto Quiroga and his caucus have declared they will give to the government of Rodrigo Paz. As a result of the first-round vote, many emphasized that after more than twenty years, the MAS party had finally disappeared, implying a huge change on the political board. But it was just a label. MAS was — and still is — somehow alive. Later, commentary pointed out that this electorate had camouflaged itself within Rodrigo Paz’s PDC. That seems to have been the case; if not, where are they? Even so, many argue that the political landscape of twenty years ago has expired because Rodrigo Paz is centrist: some say center-left, others center-right. But I believe the real shift — not only in the political landscape, which can change again in five years with bad governance and a return of the left — is Quiroga’s decision to offer his support to the elected government “in exchange for nothing.” This is a historic decision! Does the reader recall the last time, in Bolivian politics under democracy, that an agreement was made without something in return? Political scientists or historians may answer, but as far back as I can remember — never.

Tuto Quiroga’s decision is an inflection point in the recent history of Bolivian politics. It creates a context of expectations for political stability and, therefore, economic stability. It enables and encourages the new ruler to aim high in his objectives, so that over the next five years Bolivia can make a major qualitative leap and establish the foundations and direction toward progress and modernity.

To give the reader a more concrete idea of what Quiroga’s support means and how it changes the political and economic landscape, the following paragraph illustrates what I wrote before Quiroga’s decision — “Paz in His Labyrinth” — which was never published. Some excerpts follow:

“The president-elect said he would not turn to the IMF… Bilateral organizations, from friendly countries, can help, but they are not stupid nor will they just throw money away… What other options did Paz say he had? Reduce public spending ‘because there is money,’ that the problem is the massive inefficiency and corruption. Can spending be cut enough (and relatively fast) to generate a surplus and cover the needs of fuel imports, supply dollars to the economy, lift the banking ‘corralito,’ and finance minimal public investment (for example, road maintenance)? A large share of public spending is salaries, benefits, and inputs for running the public administration. And a large share of those salaries belong to teachers, doctors, police, and the armed forces. Could Paz reduce that public spending by 40 or 50%? Would he generate further recession and unemployment? Besides facing fierce resistance from the affected population with blockades and strikes, he would first have to deal with Lara (who thinks he is co-president), who promised wage hikes to everyone. Did the PDC have other financing options? … What would remain is to knock on the IMF’s door, swallowing his words. He can always manage the optics because Trump will facilitate the process, because the IMF offered help on good terms, because they will do it with sovereignty, because they have a solid plan, because they did this or that which Tuto would not have done, etc. But one never knows, and it is part of the labyrinth.”

It continues: “If Paz is consistent with his recent statements about restoring good diplomatic relations with the U.S., he should not accept any financial rescue from the Chinese and/or Russians. And now, what options remain for Paz? Trump (more than the U.S. itself) will be a factor, although unpredictable. Trump may wake up one morning in a good mood and toss a few million in bailout funds Paz’s way (like to Milei, but in miniature)… that he might influence the IMF and multilateral organizations to be more flexible with Bolivia… that he could propose an agreement in which the U.S. is granted access to lithium, rare minerals, and others… that such an agreement includes the extradition of Evo and company and coca eradication. But what would his vice president and populist entourage say?”

The reader will see that this uncertain, chaotic scenario is no longer valid. Many things would be much clearer now. One decision — Quiroga’s — entirely changed that scenario. That is the impact and the winning outcome for Bolivia.

But let us not forget: Bolivia is morally and economically bankrupt due to the absence of rule of law. The task is immense and for everyone. For twenty years, the Political Constitution of the State was mere decoration on the wall, because law was personified in Evo and later in Arce. If the Paz government does not outline a clear path for constitutional and judicial reform, and/or fails to give immediate, unequivocal signals through decrees enforced to the letter (for example: banning the blockade of streets and roads because it violates the freedom of millions of Bolivians — plain and simple), much of the hope placed on him and his government will fall like autumn leaves. Social disorder will continue, investment will not materialize, and Bolivia will remain stagnant.

The PDC will take office on November 8. Hopefully, we are beginning a new political, institutional, and economic chapter and heading into an era of development and modernization. Good luck, Bolivia!