By Carlos Toranzo, Brujula Digital:

In 2026, Bolivia—especially La Paz—experienced the hardships of more than 50 days of blockades led by the COB and the Tupac Katari peasant federation of La Paz. Was Evo Morales behind the blockades, seeking Rodrigo Paz’s resignation? Was drug trafficking behind the same process of social upheaval, interested in protecting the Bolivian sanctuary that allowed it to operate freely during 20 years of MAS governments?

The answers are affirmative, with an additional element: one should not separate the rapist from drug trafficking. He is one of its pieces, its bishop when the time comes to initiate and develop social unrest. But—and this is the most important point—drug trafficking in Bolivia is broader and more complex than Evo Morales; perhaps he is not even its captain. It is more likely that Marset and others are more important pieces than he is. Yet, during 20 years, MAS allowed drug trafficking to grow. It increased legal coca cultivation from 12,000 to 20,000 hectares, accompanied by new technologies that multiplied coca production even further.

After two decades in which the State allowed drug traffickers to operate freely, granting them freedom of movement, we ended up with a mini-republic, Chapare, where drug-trafficking activities dominate and flourish under the protection of Morales and the six federations of the Cochabamba tropics. But Chapare is joined by Urubó, where several leaders of the most important drug cartels in South America have lived—and still live or rest comfortably.

Drug traffickers had their sanctuary and place of refuge in Bolivia. They forged ties with powerful local families, which form part of the country’s various centers of power. But not only that: over these two decades, the presence of the world’s major drug cartels in Bolivia has increased. Let us not forget that a son of El Chapo Guzmán studied aviation in Santa Cruz under the protection of MAS power and while carrying Bolivian identity documents. It is clear that the Sinaloa Cartel, Comando Vermelho, and the PCC are in Bolivia.

But drug trafficking is no longer only coca leaves, coca paste, cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana production, or the smuggling of gold and precursor chemicals; it is organized crime, which manages human trafficking, arms smuggling, and modernizes logistics in order to use Bolivia as a transit country for Peruvian cocaine destined for Brazil, Asia, Ecuador, Argentina, or Chile.

Drug trafficking has become more sophisticated worldwide. El Chapo Guzmán, El Mencho, and Mayo Zambada have penetrated the global financial system, national political systems, the judiciary, the police, customs agencies, and local governments, especially in Mexico. Precisely for that reason, Trump has the Mexican government under pressure, having identified dozens of politicians from Morena, the ruling party, as operators of drug trafficking.

Drug traffickers are not merely a group of men who plant and harvest coca. They are PhDs in the financial management of their resources. They are specialists in the search for tax havens. They are experts in the logistics of distributing illicit goods in Asia, Europe, and the Americas. They are experts in technology, constantly evolving methods to conceal cocaine, amphetamines, fentanyl, and liquid marijuana. They are skilled in the use of sophisticated weapons to protect production and distribution. They are chemical specialists in fentanyl and other increasingly sophisticated drugs.

The scale of drug trafficking in Bolivia is small compared to that circulating in Brazil, Rosario, Ecuador, Colombia, Mexico, Central America, or even Paraguay, where Ciudad del Este has an extraordinary volume of illicit products managed by organized crime.

Bolivia is not the major center of drug production, but it remains important because of the freedoms it grants traffickers to produce and distribute and, above all, to hide the big fish from the most important drug cartels. It is likely that the relatively small scale of Bolivian drug trafficking compared with that of other countries does not concern the United States very much, especially since the cocaine leaving Bolivia is not destined for the United States.

It is also likely that for that reason no action was taken against Evo Morales, who was allowed for 20 years to do as he pleased in his relationship with drug trafficking and organized crime.

But even though we are not the core of drug trafficking in Latin America and there are other countries where its volume is greater, that does not change the fact that over 20 years drug trafficking has transformed Bolivia. It has penetrated politics, the judiciary, Customs, local governments, and even the social organizations that constitute the country’s so-called “moral reserve.”

Not in vain do even the Chipayas protect drug-trafficking corridors in Bolivia. Precisely because the weight of drug trafficking is greater in Bolivia and its business operations are enormous relative to our scale, police officers pay quotas of millions of dollars to be assigned to border posts or to rise through the ranks. Members of the “olive green” force have an enormous desire to climb to positions of command because doing so grants them economic power linked to drug trafficking, whether through thefts from traffickers, protecting them, or becoming partners in the business.

The power of drug trafficking and organized crime in Bolivia is immense. It has its own national geopolitics. It controls important locations such as Caracollo, Yapacaní, Patacamaya, El Alto, Yacuiba, Puerto Suárez, and Santa Cruz, and it extends into the management of illegal mining.

Its connections reach political power, local power, the judiciary, and Customs. The suitcase scandals, the Rolex scandals, or the most recent gold case all have to do with organized crime and with a State and a government that turn a blind eye or are unwilling to attack and eradicate the businesses of that power. It is not by chance that Samuel Doria Medina’s distancing himself from the government is expressed as being for ethical reasons.

Bolivia must not normalize the actions of drug traffickers and organized crime. Society must adopt an attitude of rejection toward those in government or outside it who do nothing to combat them. Chapare cannot continue to be a narco-republic. Evo Morales must not continue to enjoy the freedoms he has to remain the bishop of drug trafficking whenever it needs him. We must understand that drug trafficking and organized crime in Bolivia are not limited to coca cultivation and the production of coca paste and cocaine hydrochloride; they encompass other, more complex and sophisticated activities that are sinking the country.

Carlos Toranzo is an economist.